You May Not Always Believe in Incentives, but Incentives ...

... believe in you.

Progressives are not hesitant to believe that McDonald's, for example, induces consumers to eat at McDonald's. They in fact will in many cases paint a picture whereby McDonald's is insidiously using some kind of mind-control secret sauce to force people to buy and eat lots more of its food than they would otherwise want to. 

What's more progressives tend to believe that many people can't or won't decide for themselves how best to choose something as important as education for their children--especially in a voucher/school choice system that funds students rather than systems. If left up to "them" (so the narrative goes), they would opt for a choice that benefited the parent even if it harmed the child. 

It seems that progressives believe many or most people are bad at making good choices for themselves and easily influenced by convenient temptations. Their worry often is that people will be hapless victims to manipulation in opposition to their own actual long-term interest. 

So why is it so hard for progressives to believe that government programs invite moral hazard and incite poor behavior and bad long-term choices? How is it that they can with a straight face claim unemployment benefits do not impede job search and acceptance? 

Megan McArdle illuminates the problem quite plainly. This is not a new problem with regard to unemployment benefits nor is it unique to it. There are many examples of this phenomenon. We saw the same obstinance the last time unemployment benefits were interfering with economic recovery. Progressives pushed back emotionally and strongly against arguments and evidence like that from Casey Mulligan.

It is as if progressives are not entirely consistent when it comes to believing in the power of incentives.

P.S. Veronique de Rugy was ahead of this problem over a year ago developing a straightforward and MUCH better method for unemployment insurance. From the linked piece:

Personal unemployment insurance savings accounts (PISAs) are designed to maintain a financial incentive to return to work as soon as possible. These accounts are individually owned by workers who, during spells of unemployment, can make orderly withdrawals to partially compensate for the loss to their income but can keep and build the balance during their regular times of employment. At the time of retirement, workers can use the balance in these accounts to bolster their retirement income or transfer to their heirs.

The incentive for workers to return to work is as strong as their desire to keep their own savings for retirement. It is thus a solution that solves the double bind of providing insurance and keeping strong incentives to return to work.

Traders Bet on Horses; Investors Bet on Horse Tracks

At times it seems that everybody wants to be a trader. Nobody wants to be an investor. 

Trading is exciting. Investing is boring. 

Traders are trying to find the arbitrage, the sure thing, trying to outthink and out play the market. 

Investors are simply trying to participate with the market as efficiently as possible and with a long-term focus. 

For every winning trader there is an equal and opposite losing trader. It is a zero-sum game. 

For every winning investor there are only various beneficiaries all of whom gained on net to one degree or another. It is a positive-sum game. There are no losers in that game provided the investor was a winner and all costs were internalized.*

*Yes, I know those conditional statements are doing a lot of work. 

Paul Kehrer, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

The Seductive Allure of Socialism

The more local something is the more essentially socialistic it becomes. I think the best way to describe this is that size/complexity has a positive relationship with the net benefits of the market (free market principles and market incentives, etc.) while size/complexity has a inverse relationship with the net benefits of socialism (yes, there are benefits). Simply put: the bigger or more complex something is, the more you want/need markets and not central planning to do the heavy lifting.

Intelligent people recognize that they know things and understand how to solve problems much better than most other people. They see this in action locally where it works or seems to at least. Thus, their belief is reinforced. This leads them down a bad path to an unreasonable conclusion that they can guide the world.

Keep in mind that what distinguishes a person as being "intelligent" can be local knowledge rather than pure IQ. Therefore, a local shop keeper may be orders of magnitude more intelligent about running her shop than would be a team of McKinsey consultants. 

Art Carden gives a model, salient version of this. For example, consider the family, the firm, and especially small and midsize towns. The local banking relationship in these places illustrates this nicely. 

The key skill of a banker today is not financial acumen. It was once upon a time at least to the degree of assessing credit risk. But large firms, algorithmic models, and risk spreading have largely supplanted that need. It is still important--vitally important for the bank itself--but it is not primarily dependent on the skill of individual banker. I believe financial risk assessment is a quality of secondary importance.

Rather the key skill of a banker today is relationship building. That is what makes a great banker. Hence, bankers are deeply involved in their communities. Again, this is not new, but it is now the primary attribute rather than a secondary one as it was in decades past.

It is strange then that a bank and its bankers, the stereotypical image of a capitalist (think of the board game Monopoly) are in fact the leading proponents of a road to local socialism. 

Here is how it unintentionally works. First, bankers are deeply interested in current customers' wellbeing and credit soundness. They have made loans, and they want them paid back. Second, they want to make future loans. These same customers would be the easy way to accomplish that goal. This gives them an all-too human impulse to favor the known and familiar as opposed to the new and (perceived) extra risky. 

Certainly bankers are interested in growth and new development. It is just that the unseen has a built-in bias against it. 

How is this a slippery road to socialism? I am not proposing that it formally leads to socialism, but it is central planning friendly. Most directly it runs the same risks of all central planning whether at the household, firm, or governmental level: decisions are made that suffer from the knowledge problem and are subject to the local maximum problem. 

Bankers are deeply imbedded within their communities for good reason: they want the business relationships and they want to stay close to the credit--all the better to monitor the risk. Yet this presents a sort of capture risk similar to formal regulatory capture. The bankers can easily be persuaded to support their customers' desires at the expense of their customers' competition. 

P.S. When I was in college I had a righteous disdain for kids wearing Che Guevara t-shirts, etc. They were "old enough" to know better. As the great P.J. O'Rourke explains, that is no longer true of kids these days, who are now the same ages as those who I rebuked back in the day.

P.P.S. Iain Murray's The Socialist Temptation explores this topic in depth. For a good discussion on it I recommend this recent episode of Jonah Goldberg's The Remnant. 

See this for more on the source for the above image and related story.

When a Deal is Not a Deal

Ben Thompson writes:

Swift is doing the exact same thing, which is why the story of her breakup with Big Machine and the question of who was right or wrong ultimately doesn’t matter; Swift, like Chappelle, is taking her masters, whether she owns them or not.

That’s the part that Logan forgot: when it comes to a world of abundance the power that matters is demand, and demand is driven by fans of Swift, not lawyers for Big Machine or Scooter Braun or anyone else.

That is part of a very good analysis of how content creators are ultimately king. The story rankles me some from the standpoint of the ethics of going back on a deal even if the deal was not made under purely power symmetrical terms.

He relates it to NFTs. The persuasive claim he makes is that NFTs derive value from the collective agreement, Arnold Kling would say consensual hallucination, that there is value.

Near the end Thompson concludes:

If the creator decides that their NFTs are important, they will have value; if they decide their show is worthless, it will not. And, in the case of Swift, if she decides that albums are valuable they will be, not because they are now scarce, but because only she can declare an album “Taylor’s Version”.

Annuities - A Troubled Solution in Search of a Problem

Years ago I'm sitting in a San Francisco coffee shop with my wife enjoying breakfast. Without trying to or really wanting to we can easily hear the conversation from a close-by table. It was two young couples. Both were well dressed, but one was decidedly more outgoing and charismatic. One might even describe them as smooth.

They were clearly on travelling together. Somehow their conversation turned to topics that drew my attention. It began innocently enough.

"Well, what are your plans?" or so went the inquiry. "Nobody wants to think about this stuff, but it is important." They were clearly talking about someone who wasn't there. 

"It is hard to know what to do."

"Look, we obviously can't know the future. But with this approach at least you have something to show for it..." Turning to her partner a little too on cue, "Remember Grandma’s experience..."

I don't remember too vividly the exact conversation--I honestly wasn't trying to listen.* It was not a simple case of a couple-friend giving friendly advice. This was a sales pitch. And they were selling the other couple on the idea of long-term care insurance, a type of annuity that has very strict terms regarding when it will be paid along with sharp limits on how much and long payment will occur. 

LTC insurance plans are not bad per se. They can work in practice; though they more frequently work in theory. While I didn't know all the relevant facts in this situation, and it was none of my business regardless, the conversation frustrated me. In fact I was offended. Why?

I was offended because they were using emotion to solve a math problem. Well, more precisely they were disguising an emotional pitch as if it were a math problem, pretending it was a math problem, and not doing or even hinting at any math! 

Presumably there would be some assumption-laden work-up presented at some point before signing on the dotted line. Let's charitably assume there was--that all we were witness to was the initial hook. Regardless, I resented both the approach and the fact that it appeared to be working.

It was a learning moment for me. As analytical as I want things to be, the truth is humans are emotion-driven beings. Many of our decisions are based on feelings. We seek social desirability and find comfort in confirmation. 

This is why confident people are charming. Especially it is so when they are selling us something. 

How you say it versus what you say--delivery versus content. They will remember how confident they were in you long after they have forgotten what you actually said. 

I remembered this story as I read this recent piece from Vanguard, Guaranteed Income: A Tricky Trade-Off. From the summary bullet points:

The math is clear. A certain income can leave retirees better prepared for an uncertain lifetime. But retirees’ reluctance to annuitize suggests that the irrevocable decision to exchange liquid wealth for guaranteed income is about more than math.**

It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that there are two types of people in the financial products industry: those who sell annuities and those who detest them. A derogatory but perhaps not unfair way of describing annuities is to say that they are never bought always sold. Another is that the primary beneficiary on a variable annuity is the sales person.

Annuities work extremely well in theory. They are straightforward instruments that spread risk and smooth income. 

In practice they are extremely complicated, notoriously misleading, and very expensive. There are exceptions. The regulations around them have improved the situation some, but I would argue strongly that this is a second-best solution behind simply allowing more competition in the industry in the first place. World-class fine dining in Napa Valley isn't because of world-class restaurant regulation. 

If you're paying attention, you'll have noticed a paradox. I started by showing that people often use emotion to sell a financial solution but then argued that emotion is keeping people from adopting those same financial solutions. But that really isn't a mystery. If people are reluctant to listen to the clear math supporting annuitizing future income, it stands to reason that emotion will be perhaps necessary to get them over the hump. 

*In fact they were so bad at attempting to be discrete that I can only assume we too were part of the sales audience.

**The Vanguard piece points to fear of regret and a strong bequest motive as the major obstacles to annuity adoption. I liked their analysis, but I don't think they sufficiently considered just how few good, honest annuity options there are. Hard to buy what isn't being sold--especially with fair options that do leave bequests. And it is harder and harder to sell them. Whether deserved or not (it is definitely deserved!), annuities have been given a bad name by all the many investment advisors who rail against them. 

Zoning Laws Suffer From The Fixed Window Fallacy

The Fixed Window Fallacy is an error in reasoning whereby people believe they know or can know what is nice/preferred/optimal. This line of thought is based on unimaginative, linear-thinking and further held back by the Local Maximum Problem. 

It can be summarized as a thought process that goes: "We know what is best. We/they can afford what is desired (after all, it is usually for our/their own good). Therefore, we should make ourselves/them provide it." 

Both premises are false, and the conclusion is fallacious (non sequitur) as it ignores the critical questions: do we have a right to do this, and can we successfully do this? 
The only constant is change, and it comes in two types. 

1. Depreciation, which is the natural condition, difficult to counter, and mostly objective.
2. Appreciation, which is the abnormal condition, difficult to achieve, and highly subjective. 

Attempts to stop depreciation such as zoning laws are never done in a vacuum. They are not single events where good replaces bad, and we move on to the next decision. They are part of economic evolution where decisions made affect trend trajectories with uncertain net outcomes and unpredictable magnitudes. 

Similarly collective action attempts to realize appreciation such as subsidizes for development and master plans are fraught with captured interest risk bringing asymmetric outcomes adverse to the presumed collective goal. In other words the rent-seeking developers and their friends in power do what is good for them and costly for society. For those cases where everyone has the best of intentions, we still have the knowledge problem. When artificial outcomes are engineered by those who do not bear the full risk, bad ideas do not get properly punished and good ideas do not get properly rewarded. 

Back to zoning, trying to stop people from doing things they want to do is prohibition. People and markets work to thwart prohibitions in proportion to how much they desire that which is prohibited. The less morally sound the prohibition, the less compliant are those working against it and those third parties who have no dog in the fight. Fortunately the long-term trend is for less and less prohibition. Unfortunately working against a prohibition is costly as is the administration of a prohibition. 

Whether it is in icky markets (e.g., sex work, recreational drugs deemed illicit, kidney transplants, etc.) or in we-know-better markets (e.g., zoning), an underlying force supporting the prohibition is not in my backyard thinking. In fact I believe NIMBY is the last vestige of prohibition rationalization.

An Addition to My The Big Five

I hate having to do this, but I feel it is necessary to add to my list of the low-hanging fruit of public policy where 90% solutions (improvements) on these issues are several orders of magnitude more important than 99% solutions on a thousand others. In my defense this was always filed under "partial list", and it continues to be. I just hate making a tag and then needing to update it. 

Keep in mind that I did issue addendums to the list shortly after first publication. This will take one of those and elevate it to the new big list.

The Big Six:

• Drug Prohibition (end it--allow adults to make their own choices)
• Education (privatize it--give the government an ever-smaller role)
• Immigration (open it up--allow people to freely move and freely interact with other people)
• Taxation (simplify and redirect it--efficiently tax the use of resources not the creation of resources)
• War (move away from it--make postures less bellicose and violence less of an option).
• ***AND*** Housing Development (greatly reduce the obstacles and restrictions so that the owners of capital can buy, build, and reconfigure real estate as they see fit)

First because of Kevin Erdmann's work and recently because of Bryan Caplan's current discussion and forthcoming work, I have become radicalized to make this addition to my reform agenda canon. 

Living in a historic district with all its well-intended nonsense, I see this issue close at hand. The HD seems to be a classic case of people being nostalgic for a past that didn’t actually exist. The effect is expense for homeowners, self-righteous satisfaction for busybodies, a jobs program for the rent-seeking suppliers and regulators, and general exclusion for those who don’t fit in or can’t afford to. 

Every day I see stark examples of the perfect being the enemy of the good. 

A Paradox of Choice

When well-meaning fools lament the plethora of choices we have in a free market society, they make a crucial mistake. They ignore the necessary condition for which those choices emerge and simply assume a result. 

I can imagine a very well constructed study done that proves, truly proves in a way that most all could agree, that ~99% of why a consumer chooses A versus B comes down to irrational affiliations or random luck. For example the determination of what car one chooses to buy between a Honda Accord and a very similar Toyota Camry would be shown to be nothing more than stuff like a person's prior cars happened to be Hondas or their parents bought Hondas or they buy the car they last saw an ad for or their favorite color is red and the car the dealer first showed them was red, etc.

The incorrect conclusion a well-meaning fool might jump to is that we have unnecessary redundancy in our free market economy. We should stop wasting resources on the competition because the differences between these artificial choices are illusory. Just build the Acamry and be done with it!

The fact that there are minor, subtle, and hidden differences between all such choices are lost on those drawing such conclusions. But more importantly they are making a dangerous mistake to neglect how we got to the magnificent state of the world where we have such amazing choices that a purchase decision settled by a coin flip likely leaves the consumer equally well off. 

There are no instructions from the universe for how to build the optimal mass-consumer sedan. We need a process to discover this and continually rediscover and improve upon the outcome. We need the right incentives to reward incremental success, punish incremental failure, and fully stop efforts going down a bad path. The capitalist free market is this process. It is the sine qua non for progress--as broadly defined as one can imagine it.

PS. Or maybe this is optimal?

A Greater Sage Theory

Just a few wondering thoughts on the latest techno-investing development--non-fungible tokens or NFTs.

What gives a collectible object value? Are NFTs like Beanie Babies or Picasso paintings? 

Think of this as a spectrum between pure speculation and pure intrinsic value. An object never lies entirely on one end or the other of this dimension. Where it resides is also not necessarily stable.

Fine art is "fine" in that it has a low degree of speculation relative to perceived intrinsic value. 

Gold is the ultimate financial consensual hallucination – – we can easily, reliably believe that it will have value across societies and well into the future. It is much more difficult to believe that Beanie Babies will have that quality. Picasso paintings are somewhere in between.

Scarcity is an important quality for determining marginal value, but it doesn't say much of anything about intrinsic value. This is the crux of the diamond-water paradox. I think there are two important subtypes of scarcity as it relates to collectibles: organic and manufactured.

Organic scarcity is producing 10,000 Babe Ruth cards and only 1,000 survive decades into the future. Manufactured scarcity is knowing that 10,000 Derek Jeter cards are desired but only producing 1,000 of them. 

Organic scarcity might be thought of as "authentic", but that too is in the eye of the beholder. The 1,000 Babe Ruth cards aren't any rarer in the example above given those parameters.

NFTs are a manufactured scarcity. However that is not very important except to the extent that someone values genuine authentic scarcity--the organic kind--as opposed to fabricated scarcity. Yet I can easily see an appreciation for the manufactured scarcity nature of NFTs. So don't be too quick to dismiss the limited denominator as a factor for these collectibles.

To the extent you can believe that people will continue to value the interestingness of NFTs along with the thing (art work, sports moment, etc.) that a particular NFT is associated with, you can credibly and reliably believe that that specific NFT will have value. 

At this point they are obviously deep on the speculation side of the speculation vs intrinsic value spectrum. Time will tell.

A Hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 Study

Perhaps this already exists, but I doubt it. At least I do not expect this ambitious of a study has been attempted at the rigor I desire. And I know it is a lot to ask. 

Nevertheless, here is the rough outline of what I'd love to see done well.

Independent variables examined using county-level data for the U.S.:

• 20-day trailing average humidity
• 20-day trailing average temperature
• Latitude 
• Population density
• Stringency measure (government-mandated restrictions)
• Mobility measure during COVID relative to the same mobility measure average value for 2019
• Median income
• Proportion of population 65+
• Percentage of elderly in LTC facilities
• Population proportion by ethnic/race ancestry (hypothesizing that prior immunities are associated different geographies)
• Date of first case within y-hundred miles (adjusting for treatments, interventions, etc. changing over the timeline)

Results:

• I would like to see the cross sectional results of confirmed COVID deaths by standardized timeline (from date of first case; from date of first death; from x days past first case within y-hundred miles).
• I would also like to see the time series analysis in total and by various cohorts for confirmed COVID deaths. 

My general hypothesis is that every thoughtful observer will find the results somewhat surprising. These same, thoughtful observers come at the problem with their own biases and priors as well as some unintentional agendas (the intentional agendas are for the unthoughtful observers). I think they tend to emphasize the areas they find compelling while somewhat negligently remaining silent or quiet on the areas they actually don't disagree about but feel are overemphasized by others. To that extent there is a lot of talking past one another. I am very specifically thinking about the realms of both the libertarian/classical liberal/neoliberal/generally freedom-championing thinkers and the economists/social and public policy thinkers. 

The problem is the audience has very much grown and diversified for these thinkers. It is very hard for the casual observer to understand the nuance and the starting positions of general agreement. For example, the public has always been completely oblivious about the fact that economists agree fundamentally to the vast extent that they do.

In the case of COVID this problem has been greatly magnified. And at the same time the slippage into hyperbole has been greatly amplified too. The result is painting ourselves into corner solutions. When the narrative has been taken to the extent that many so often and so easily have taken it (myself included of course), our narratives tend to fall apart. Again, this is for the thoughtful observers. 

P.S. Yes, at first glance I can see potential problems with the independent variables, and I assume there are many more I can't yet imagine. The covariance between stringency and mobility might force one of them out of the analysis. In that case I would like to see a rigorous comparison between just these two--Phil Magness points to some of what I would expect in that voluntary mobility changes dominate policy. After all, politicians follow rather than lead.

A Crowding Theory to Explain the Trade of the Decade

Bold title, I know. Yet while there may be some hyperbole in it, we do face a situation in equity markets quite unlike anything we've seen since the dot-com tech bubble era. 

[Disclaimer: This is not investment advice because I don't know you. I am not analyzing your situation, your appropriateness or suitability for equity or any other investment idea, your goals, or your risk tolerance. This is an attempt to explain what I believe to be the valuation existent in the market today. Read at your own risk.]

I. The Trade of The Decade

Typically with tolerable variation equities are "cheap" or "expensive" at the same time. The Great Recession was a period where equities went on sale, so to speak, for those willing and able to bear the risk. You didn't have to be brilliant; you just had to be brave. Buying and holding throughout the deepest points of the downturn (roughly Oct 2008 - Mar 2009) was a rewarding investment. Make no mistake it was not easy to do this as for years after the market bottomed it still never felt quite safe, but that is what investors generally and equity investors specifically get rewarded for--buying when no one wants to. 

At least they should be rewarded for that. And the expected reward is the "risk premium"--the expected return over and above the return for a risk-free investment. Think of it simply as the premium you should expect to earn for bearing the risk. Every investment has one. Sometimes it is relatively high like for stocks in the early 2010s. Sometimes it is relatively low like for stocks in the late 1990s. That "relative" measure could be in relation to its own history alone, the position of that asset class compared to other asset classes, or both. Current market risk premiums are the foundation behind my hypothesis that a big opportunity/challenge is in front of equity investors today.

The "trade of the decade" I allude to is a relative trade. Unlike so many highly-touted trades in history, this one is fairly simple. I wish to briefly outline it without effectively proving it so as to get to the true purpose of this post: a hypothesized reason for the opportunity to exist in the first place. After all, I am a strong supporter of semi-strong efficient markets theory (EMH).

First, some assumptions:

1. Markets are generally efficiently priced. This means all important known information is thoroughly and quickly incorporated into market prices. Therefore, an investor should not expect to be able to outperform the market. 
2. Risk tolerance (degree of risk aversion) among investors and risk outlook (the economic picture going forward) determine risk premia. The world looked very scary in March 2020 and investors' general appetites for risk were substantially lower than usual. 
3. Risk premiums today are generally low across all asset classes. A couple of ways to say this in everyday language are: equity returns going forward (next ten years) will be lower than what we have enjoyed historically especially in the last 11 years and interest rates look to be lower for longer (lower than historically and for longer than typically has been the case). Caveat: risk premiums can be low and returns look high and vice versa. I am being a bit casual with how I equate risk premiums and future returns as compared to history, but I believe the underlying point holds.

Here is the problem, opportunity, and challenge all rolled up into one. Today certain portions of the stock market look fairly expensive (high valuation) while other parts look fairly attractive (low valuation). To be more concrete about it the high/low valuations are in comparison to those specific equity subclasses' own history. However, adding to the puzzle the risk premia for those asset classes look typical for the expensive group while they likely are desirable for the attractive group. 

Even a sloppy reader at this point is growing quite frustrated by the fact that I haven't identified which groups of stocks I put into the expensive and attractive categories. That is intentional as I don't want that to be the takeaway from this post, but I will now relieve that frustration as long as you know I am NOT effectively proving my case. Take this too as assumption. 

From the perspective of valuation, large-cap stocks in the U.S. (especially growth-style stocks) are expensive compared to their own history. Small-cap stocks in the U.S. (especially value-style stocks) are cheap compared to their own history. International stocks (especially value-style stocks) are also cheap compared to their own history. One way to measure valuation is to look at the current market price compared to the earnings, the P/E ratio. The higher the ratio all else equal the more expensive the stock.

One of the best ways to see this is to look at long-term analyses of real (inflation-adjusted) price/earnings ratios. The most famous of these is Shiller's CAPE (cyclically-adjusted PE) for the S&P 500 index. 

We can then do very similar analysis on various other indices considering important subclasses to see how they compare to the S&P 500 (large-cap U.S. stocks). This analysis [summarized in the table below] is where we see these key differences. Namely, that the riskier areas of the stock market (value-style companies, smaller sized companies, international companies, et al.) look relatively inexpensive.

Risk premiums* [analysis and results not shown] both echo some of the valuation analysis as well as tell a bit of a different story. The risk premium for large U.S. stocks is near the median of where it has been over the last 15 or so years meaning that adjusted for risk these stocks look appropriately priced. The risk premium for small U.S. stocks is far above its own historical median meaning adjusted for risk these stocks look very low priced. To a lesser degree the same low price depiction can be ascribed to international value stocks. The risk premium for international growth stocks is more similar to large U.S. stocks (i.e., it is around its historic median). So we have a general range of stocks from those that look appropriately priced (safer stocks like large companies and growth-style companies) to those that still look attractively priced (riskier categories mentioned before).

The risk premium story is not as sanguine for large U.S. stocks as it may appear. Despite my assumption above that interest rates will remain low for a long time, they don't have to. And they can rise meaningfully above current levels and still be historically low. If they do rise, that will have a big impact on stock valuations. Large growth stocks in particular look very sensitive to this risk as their cash flows come far into the future. A rising interest rate means a rising discount rate applied to those cash flows, which reduces the current value of the stock.

The trade of the decade is to fade away from large U.S. stocks and increase exposure to small U.S. stocks (especially value) and international stocks (especially value). The most acute version of this is for large growth versus small value stocks in the U.S. Specifically we could identify indices like the Russell Top 200® Growth Index and compare it to indices like the Russell 2000® Value Index. The reason I call it the trade of the decade is because my more in-depth analysis focuses on 10-year expected returns and risk pricing as well as the fact that it might take a decade to fully play out. The reason you should heed caution before engaging in this trade is (1) this risk might not be for you (it indeed comes with risk not specified in this post) and (2) this is not an endorsement of reducing diversification (I still advocate exposure to large-growth stocks, etc.).

II. The Crowding Theory

IF I am correct about the different relative risk-adjusted valuations for various equity subclasses such as large growth stocks versus small value stocks, interesting questions emerge. How did this come to be? What explains it consistent with EMH?

I believe two crowding effects have brought this about. Flight to safety is the first crowding effect. Sophisticated money avoiding public equities is second. 

Recall my assumption that risk premia are determined by the general level of risk aversion among investors and the market's risk outlook. The tidal wave of the pandemic that unfolded gradually then suddenly from mid-January 2020 through to the market bottom of late March 2020 was a massive reevaluation of risk that triggered an extreme flight to safety. Note that it was not the entirety of the valuation dispersion between various groups of stocks. For some time now growth has been outperforming value, large has been outperforming small, and U.S. has been outperforming international. For U.S. equities the market's reaction to the pandemic was in fact the dominant portion of the differences we see today. 

From Vanguard: 

Difference in annualized total returns over rolling five-year periods

Source: https://advisors.vanguard.com/insights/article/growthvsvaluewillthetideschange

As the risks and worry of the pandemic grew, investors sought refuge in the safest of assets, U.S. Treasury securities. This lowered interest rates to nearly zero across the yield curve. They also derisked in other ways. For those who wanted continued equity exposer, they flocked to the safest equities in the world, large U.S. growth companies. The now much lower interest rate conditions worked in tandem to make these equities more and more attractive. The riskier aspects of the market suffered as investors tended to rotate away from them and into safety. 

So that is how risk premiums for various stocks got so extremely different, but why didn't sophisticated investors step in to absorb the difference? After all, they are supposed to have extremely long (infinite?) time horizons and not be subject to wild swings in risk. 

Sophisticated investors is a bit pejorative on my part. Here I am talking about the so-called "smart money" of institutional investors like endowments and pension funds. They like to think of themselves as cunning lions, but they bunch together like scared, vulnerable sheep. Theoretically, they should be a counterbalance to short-horizon investors who are theoretically much more sensitive to changes in risk appetite and risk conditions. 

For example, a person close to or recently entering retirement should be invested positionally to withstand the risk of market volatility. The same can be said of any investor--they should be so positioned. Yet often times they are not. And even more often they are liable to overreact to bad news leading them to drastically alter their investment positioning as an attempt to predict the future. However, I do not think this is a big effect. It is a behavioral story that isn't necessarily as irrational as it seems--extreme events like the Great Recession and COVID pandemic give us insights into our attitudes on risk tolerance not apparent before. 

At the same time the sophisticated investors themselves are subject to the same types of risk tolerance reevaluation. Rather, to be a counter-balance they need to be in the market. The reason why the “smart money” hasn’t absorbed all the excess risk premium in riskier aspects of the market already is because endowments and pensions have trended far from traditional public markets. Endowments have on average reduced their public market equity exposures by 50% in the past 50 years going from about 60% to less than 30%. They are crowding away from public equities making them unavailable to provide a counterweight. 

To be sure riskier assets have done well in the past few months--small-cap U.S. stocks were up 35% for the three months ending in January 2021. The primary catalyst were vaccine developments in November. Add to that improvement in our understanding of the true risks of the pandemic as well as rapidly improving economic fundamentals. Even still, risk premiums in risky assets (value, small cap, international stocks) are at elevated levels compared to their own history as well as their safer equity counterparts. 

As risk aversion gradually (and perhaps in sudden bursts) returns to normal levels and as the risk outlook continues to improve, my hypothesis is that those assets with outsized risk premiums will perform relatively well (high confidence) and absolutely well (moderate confidence). 

Incidentally while this bodes well for public risk assets, it likely portends poorly for alternatives (private equity, venture capital, hedge funds, et al.). That is a crowded space with not much low-hanging fruit, and what is there is very expensive to be had. 

*The reason I deliberately gloss over the risk premium results is the model I am referring to is proprietary, but more importantly the calculation of risk premia is art and science. Laden with assumptions, it can be very much argued over in fine detail. However, I believe the depiction above is well grounded and firmly supported by a wide range of reasonable underlying assumptions. For more on this topic see Research Affiliates work among many others. 

Fine Art Markets as Taxes on the Rich

I previously explored some of the many problems with art markets and art museums in particular. Let us now turn to the question of the art of taxing art.

The counter to the oft made accusation that lotteries are taxes on the poor might be that fine art is a tax on the rich. What better way for the rich the be relieved of their capital? 

Assuming the rich won't be investing it studiously, using their capital to purchase art at highly inflated prices is preferred to them spending it on goods and services with more tangible resource demands, and perhaps it is preferred to them giving it away to charity. If we don't trust them to invest it well, why would we trust them to donate it any better. 

Of course, we have to think this through. Doesn’t somebody end up using the funds to purchase consumption? Likely in many cases, but as long as they are operating in a closed system (I buy your painting, you buy my sculpture), this needn’t be the case. 

And all the better if the art is fake. Turns out a lot of the art in museums is fake (perhaps +5%), and all the players in the art world are on the take to keep this a secret. If the rich are swapping art at inflated prices that isn't actually authentic art, we have them well occupied spending their wealth, potential demands on resources, on a minimal amount of actual resources. Listen to Michael Lewis' The Hand of Leonardo for more on this. 

Yes, it would push resources into pursuing production/creation of fine art (too many painters and sculptors) but is this really so bad at the margin? 

How should we actually tax it? Tax deductibility for donations to museums is problematic. If I give up a non-income producing asset, why should I necessarily avoid an income tax? And if I give it to an entity exempt from income tax, this is doubly problematic. Should we separate fine art from collectibles (wine vs paintings vs classic cars vs musical instruments, etc.) with the ultimate distinction being those that are value-holding assets (similar to precious metals) versus those that are consumption assets? How much of each quality does a piece of art possess and who decides? This gets pretty fraught pretty quickly. Back to Michael Lewis' podcast above, the compromised ref is very much at risk.

Should we exclude art and collectibles transactions under a consumption tax such as a VAT or national sales tax? These activities aren’t significant resource consumptions. All else equal we want to encourage this swapping as opposed to the funds being spent on actual resources.

If you tax something, you get less of it. My principal is to tax the use of resources and not the creation of resources. A consumption tax does this, but items like art pose problems. Unlike pure capital assets (stocks and bonds for example), collectibles have consumption value and use resources. It looks to me at first glance that most VAT systems distinguish between individuals and firms with only the later subject to the VAT. This makes sense and probably preserves my secondary idea of not unnecessarily discouraging the rich from "taxing" themselves through art.

P.S. Also, see this interesting report.

The Trouble with Art Museums

A few years ago I had the pleasure of visiting the Barnes Foundation art museum in Philadelphia. It is extraordinary, and I highly recommend it. The history of this art collection and why it is where it is today is very interesting. And that's where the trouble begins.

Supposedly, the art collection is worth $25 billion! Wow, that's a big number. If your first thought upon hearing that is, "how would we know?", you are thinking like an economist.

If the museum burned to the ground losing all the art inside, would the loss to society actually be $25 billion? How would we know? Without robust and recent market transactions, we wouldn't. Yet that is just the beginning of the problem. 

The reason the art is in its current location is because in the 1990s the foundation was in financial trouble. One solution was to take some of the art on a world tour and then move the collection, the Barnes, to Philly. Maybe I'm just naïve or cynical, but things worth $25 billion aren't that hard to cash flow normally. 

The foundation raised about $150 million dollars to relocate a few miles into Philly from Merion Station, PA building a new facility and presumably using the remainder as an on-going endowment for maintenance. While there are many minor points to reconcile in all the legal and financial battle involving the move, there is a bigger point I'd like to make. Admission to the museum is at most $25. What's more, capacity is very limited--it is a relatively small space with limited hours of operation. At $25 billion in value why isn't there a line out the door and/or a very high-priced secondary market for tickets? Seems like a steal. Well, it is part of the art market; therefore, it probably is . . . just not in the way my questions would indicate. 

The art world is not designed--no system this involved ever is. It is the result of an emergent evolution. The spontaneous order that created it and drives it is not entirely or even largely benign. It is the result of a series of intentional manipulations and unintentional consequences from private, selfish, and in some cases socially-negative ulterior motives. Art museums aren't about public access to refined artistic culture. 

Allow me to begin the disillusionment with an excellent EconTalk, Michael O'Hare on Art Museums. The most forbidden thing an art museum can do is sell any of its collection. Even if it means some art will never be seen, it is somehow better that it stay in cold storage than be sullied by commercial activity. For the short version on why, see this episode of Adam Ruins Everything. For the longer version, see this article from Quartz. 

Value is like water--it seeks its own level. Interferences with this natural process can be expensive and often are resource destructive. One version of this is politically powerful people, who are otherwise unwilling to put their money where their advocacy mouth is, working to stop market transactions. Consider also cases like when the city of Detroit's bankruptcy reorganization had creditors pursuing the collection at the Detroit Institute of Art. 

This is the kind of example where preventing "priceless" collections from being sold or commercialized might mean very hard choices for governments facing enormous pension liabilities. If those assets are off limits, there are two big problems. The first is how the liability problem gets solved once a great option (selling off valuable assets) is removed. The second is how well can that same entity be a good steward for the art. They have already gotten themselves into financial difficulty, and now they are additionally constrained by having to at least store the art. 

I enjoy art museums generally and some in particular. The idea of art museums is something I support in theory, but in practice it has become rather fraught with very undesirable aspects. The pretentiousness is not just a bug. It is a feature of a bigger bug. Art museums are about exclusion despite the conventional marketing otherwise. Perhaps they are simply fancy, tax-favored institutions for hoarders? Malcolm Gladwell's Revisionist History makes the case in two episodes. 

Speaking of taxes, that is yet another troubling aspect of the art market with museums playing a key role. I'll explore that in the next post. 

The Time of Biden

Now that all the attempts at election stealing are over I feel compelled to put down in writing some predictions about Biden's presidency. Call it political fatigue from the 400 years of the Trump Presidency, but it is hard for me to muster much energy to do this. Still, here goes . . .

Optimism:

There are two kinds of optimism in the case of Biden--relative and absolute. The relative is in regard to the Trump alternative and perhaps the Biden of politics past. The absolute is more genuine if not also more wishful. 

Trade - This one is quite positive even though it is strongly of the relative variety. Biden was never great on trade and many times poor. Still this has changed as he shifts in the political winds. He both wants/needs to be not Trump and the political base is different for Democrats today than it was when he first ran for president over three decades ago. See my Five Tribes theory for background, but Labor is not the Democratic lock that it was in the past. Just a reset to pre-2018 (actual policy) and pre-2016 (rhetoric) would be a great improvement. 

Immigration - There is a strong chance that Biden will be very good on immigration. The development of Democrats getting better on immigration has been building for some time having only accelerated under Trump. So in this case we have relative and absolute improvement opportunities. 

Drug Policy - My optimism is tempered here, but it is present in an absolute sense. At the very least we should get a more hands-off, non-escalating war on drugs policy. This is a BIG improvement from what we would have expected from a 1990s Biden. My baseline expectation is eventual of decriminalization/legalization of marijuana within the next few years.  

Presidential Prestige - I am optimistic that the tone and style of the office will now be back to a civilized place--very much a relative optimism. The office of the U.S. President should be occupied by a person easily described as a gentleman or lady. Trump never fit this description, and his final days were the icing on the top. Yes, I want that same office to be greatly diminished in terms of power and worship. My hope was Trump would deliver the diminishment without going Game of Thrones. Largely my fear of getting the reverse was realized. 

Pessimism:

Unlike the optimism analysis, the pessimism comes basically only in the absolute variety. It is also the areas I tend to be most confident, unfortunately. 

Judicial Appointments - This one is not as pessimistic as one might assume. I don't want judges from the right or the left--that is a silly concept. I want judges that think critically and consistently demonstrating good application of the Law. Certainly I expect Biden's typical nominee will be less desirable than was the typical Trump nominee from my perspective. However, the best judges are impartial and well reasoned, and those include very many Biden will nominate. 

Regulation - The Trump administration was flat out good on regulation compared to any recent president (probably including Reagan!). He didn't as much shrink, though, as he reduced or stopped the growth of the regulatory state. Biden will reverse this trend. There is one area where Trump was certainly bad and Biden will likely continue this just in a different flavor--industrial policy/meddling with individual firms and industries. 

Taxes - Many people are rightfully worried about this for mostly wrong reasons. They don't want their own tax rates to go up. Ignoring the fiscal hypocrisy of this given the spending policies these same people typically demand, it is not a major problem that individual income tax rates (especially at the high end) are likely to increase. What people should be worried about is corporate tax rates increasing and to a lesser degree capital gains rates increasing. These are both much more destructive forms of taxes as they are taxing the creation of resources rather than the use of resources. Additionally, the restoration of the SALT deduction and the reduction in the standard deduction are also bad potential outcomes of coming tax policy.

War - I am hopeful that this ends up being an area like others mentioned where Biden today is different than he has been over the last 40 years. Despite this hope, you'll notice in which category I have placed it. 

Woke Politics and Policies - Think of this item as the inverse of Trump's nationalism. The risks are similar including divisive policies and rhetoric as well as censorship and ostracization. 

Spending - Your first thought should be, "Pessimistic on spending? Have you seen 2020?" True, but in only that limited and aberrational case is the relative comparison optimistic for Biden. The ratchet works in one direction generally, and even the possibility of a republican midterm sweep doesn't leave me optimistic.

Presidential Power & Authority - Here is the other side of presidential prestige from above. Every president in the last 20+ years has looked at the prior administrations' advancement of executive orders and general authority and said simply, "Hold my beer". If we only had another branch of government designed to be the strongest branch and willing to hold presidents accountable and within the bounds of their legal authority . . . 

Overall: 

The Biden years will hopefully be a time of surprise at how good some things are, not so bad other things are, and tolerably bad the balance is. This is how I now view the Clinton presidency. All of it is quite relative of course. Hope aside, I am more optimistic than I would have expected being faced with a Biden administration. Still the pessimistic angles are acute and meaningful. 

P.S. What about COVID-19 and the pandemic? While I expect a lot of theater to emerge and a rewriting of some history in favor of the current winners, the substantive part of this large issue is basically settled. In this way it doesn't matter much who won this election. Most of the decisions to be made are in the same incapable hands of FDA and other government officials along with the capable hands of private firms, organizations, and individuals. And in many ways the die is cast. The trajectory of the virus is set--declining regardless of what comes next but with a trajectory that very much can change depending on policy and actions taken. This is true and basically the same under Biden or Trump and even without vaccines. Vaccines are just a wonderful accelerator of the progress against the virus, which very much means fewer people suffering and dying.