Stock Picking: The Game Within The Game

It is important to understand the game you’re actually playing in all endeavors. In stock picking among other areas of active investment many times the game that is being played is not the one that is at first perceived. It is also not always the one commonly believed or advertised to be being played. 

Goldman Sachs is on the other side of grandma's trade. Grandma and her investment club might have been putting in some pretty good research, but they’re very unlikely to outperform the models and information advantage a firm like Goldman Sachs will have. 

As general investors selecting exposure to the market when we evaluate Goldman Sachs, we evaluate them against the market. That is the correct benchmark for a potential or current investor as that is the central question: Am I better off investing with this particular active stock picker or is there another that can do a better job including using a passive index fund? Perhaps more appropriately and completely the question really is: Is the performance Goldman Sachs delivered appropriate for the risk taken, and could I have achieved as good or better results with as much or even less risk? 

That is the game we are playing when we choose investment in a fund manager, but that is not the game that Goldman Sachs, a fund manager, is playing. Goldman Sachs is not trying to beat the market per se. Goldman Sachs and more precisely specific fund managers within the large organization that is Goldman Sachs are trying to beat grandma and her investment club along with all the other relatively novice investors in the market. 

Personally as a wealth manager I am trying to help clients reach financial goals by investing so that their risk-adjusted return is appropriate for them. That is the game I am trying to play--rather than trying to beat the market, I am trying to match their risk/return exposure to their goals. That might mean using a Goldman Sachs fund if I think it is the best option in that specific area. 

Yet clients often don't want to play that game. In wealth management one of the more frustrating things to deal with is competing against mythical portfolios that clients think exist. An example of which might be when a client is told stories at the country club or down at the barbershop about how great someone else’s portfolio is performing. 

It is very difficult to compete against a phantom. Floyd in the barbershop is probably not doing as well as he claims. In fact it is very likely Floyd is under performing the competition because the competition for Floyd is Goldman Sachs among others. 

For Floyd to feel good with his investments, he only has to compare himself to those decisions he happens to remember along with hypothetical investments he did or did not choose to make. Floyd’s benchmark is cash and imagination. 

For Goldman Sachs to succeed they specifically have to beat most of the Floyds out there and only loosely do they need to keep up with the market. In the long run they probably don’t stand a chance against the market but in the long run that’s not who they really are competing against. 

For those of us who want to be investors with Goldman Sachs, the proper benchmark to compare them to is the market. But the bottom line for Goldman Sachs is a benchmark against Floyd, and Floyd never stood a chance. 

Desperately Seeking Alpha

Great investing is generally about taking on the right risks and being compensated properly for risks taken. It is primarily NOT about out trading other investors.  

This is a sister post to Does Active Investing Work in Theory? exploring the two types of active management: alpha seeking and risk-adjusted return matching. The former is the sexy one; for almost all of us the latter is the realistic one. 

Let's make sure when we say "alpha" we all agree on what we are talking about. The term alpha generally means some version of outperformance. Imagine two runners in a 400m race where one finishes half a second ahead of the other. The faster finisher could be said to have .5 seconds of alpha over the opponent. But that is a bit too simplistic. In investing we usually want to know if any apparent outperformance is actually truly outperformance once we consider any inherent differences between competitors including adjusting for risk taken. 

In a fair race there shouldn't be inherent differences in the playing field so to speak. The runners are on the same track travelling at the same time. For investors we don't get such clean, simple comparisons. Even for our runners on an elliptical track the runner on the inside ring will have to start a bit behind the other runner so as to compensate for the less distance of the inner track lane and so the finish line can be a straight line across the track. 

What about risk taken? Pushing the analogy consider if one of the runners was using performance-enhancing drugs. This could be in one of two varieties. In one case they could be banned substances that if caught he would be disqualified. An outside gambler betting on him was taking a greater risk than perhaps he intended. In the other case they could be allowed substances but that have dangerous potential side effects. His risk now is that he runs the race (maybe winning and maybe not) and then suffers a bad health outcome. 

Back to investing, we ideally want to compare the performance of two investors isolating just the set of factors inherent in their investment "skill". I put skill in quotes because we never can be quite sure we are seeing skill or luck or that we have forgotten about an important difference we would have intended to adjust away. 

Most of the time in investing it is risk in its many forms that we want to adjust for. As an example, if I tell you I am a great investor because I have substantially outperformed my S&P 500 benchmark for the past 5 years, you might not be so impressed if I then reveal that it is because my only investment has been the single stock Apple, Inc. Sure, I outperformed in total return, but I took WAY more risk to do so. If that risk adjustment isn't made, we can't say much about this so-called outperformance.

There are other adjustments to consider like if an investor has been using inside information to facilitate his outperformance. The fact that this unethical practice might not be repeatable should make us doubt that this outperformance is replicable. At some point we would have to consider if the inside information advantage was just a different version of luck. 

Alpha seeking in active management is an attempt to outperform the competition, be it other investors or a benchmark index, adjusted for risk. How is this such a daunting task? Don't we hear about great investors all the time doing exactly this? Actually we do not. We hear about some investors' performances when they happen to be outperforming and often that is not true outperformance because they are not risk adjusted. But there is more to say about how difficult this is.

The capital markets (stocks, bonds, etc.) are very efficient markets primarily because they are very thick markets (i.e., there are lots of people participating in them). This is helped by the fact that they are very lucrative to those who perform well in them. The idea that some investors will outperform is a near certainty. The idea that that investor is you or someone you pick to follow is highly unlikely. 

Public capital markets are a ruthless machine viciously and constantly seeking to eliminate any advantage an investor may possess. The more brilliant your new method of discovering and unlocking outperformance, the more quickly and decisively the market will absorb it away from you. And in those cases where apparent persistence in outperformance exists, the more likely a hidden risk difference has yet to be understood.

For active management the sooner one gives up on alpha the happier and more financially successful one will likely be. Instead of trying to outperform adjusted for risk, try to just keep up by taking the right risks. 

A human investor's benchmark isn't a stock index or a bond index or some combination of the two. It is the realistic financial goals they are trying to achieve. These are some combination of consuming well today and being able to consume well tomorrow and for the rest of one's life. For most of us this includes more than ourselves--primarily our family and somewhat our friends and our charitable desires.

Our investment portfolios must be constructed initially and revised regularly to be appropriate for achieving these goals successfully. This is intentionally vague since it isn't something we easily know even for ourselves much less specifically for others. What we can say is that broadly diversified, low-fee investment into marketable securities should help our cause in most cases. 

Hence, the active management of financial assets that I believe desirable for most all investors is simply risk-adjusted return matching. Try to get the market's return adjusted for the risk you want and need to take. Notice two important nuances in that last sentence: the market is more than the stock market and I am framing risk not as something to avoid but rather as something to embrace appropriately. Risk negation isn't a thing. Risk tradeoff is. You are taking and will take risk. PERIOD. 

What risks to take more of and what risks to take less of is the essence of good investing. Being well diversified into low-fee index funds takes care of some of the typical risk factors like concentration risk, market risk, and credit risk, but others persist beyond that first step. In most cases one needs to also consider liquidity risk (being able to use one's financial assets when one needs to), inflation risk (maintaining purchasing power), wipe-out risk (losing so much one is permanently set back to a lower standard of living or truly financially wiped out), bad-discipline risk (letting emotion drive decisions that thwart the long-term plan; this could be the more obvious bailing out at the worst possible moment but also the less obvious overexposure due to complacency or exuberance), and mismatch risk (having an investment portfolio poorly constructed to fit with an investor's specific investment horizon and objectives). These risks push in different directions at different times and with different magnitudes. Active management is a fluid process of balancing and rebalancing risk tradeoffs.

Successful active management is difficult enough before attempting to then add alpha to the objective set. Notice also that attempts at alpha generation might certainly interfere both intentionally and unintentionally with risk management since taking on different risk profiles is both a means and an effect of reaching for alpha.

Leave it up to the professionals to try to generate alpha. You are too smart to lose money they way they do. 

P.S. Related: How Active is Your Passive? - The Big Picture (ritholtz.com)

What I'm Worried About as a Crypto Investor

Much like throwing a pass in football, there are three general outcomes from crypto investing, and two of them are bad. Namely, aside from maintaining or increasing in value, crypto assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum could become nearly valueless to an investor in two distinct ways. They could go bust or they could fail to reward investors even though they prove valuable to society in general. 

I consider these two bad outcomes distinct since they are so different in every manner except for the ultimate experience for investors. In the one case we have the conjecture that cryptocurrencies are vaporware that are just riding a greater-fool wave that will ultimately come crashing down. Label this one the "worthless" scenario.

In the other case we have the concern that even though crypto and its inseparable blockchain technology are godsends, there is no way to actually profit from their benefits directly. Label this one the "unable-to-capture-worth" scenario. 

Which one you subscribe to or concern yourself with says a lot about your crypto demeanor. For me the second concern is what keeps me up at night. I am a modest investor and a big, enthusiastic supporter. I want it to win and for me to win with it. 

Others are rooting for it to lose because they don't believe or don't want to believe in it or maybe some of both. For these doubters there is often a FOMO element that partially drives the want for crypto's demise. But in many cases these are thoughtful people making intelligent arguments against.

While the case against crypto isn't completely empty, I believe the clock is running out on that perspective. As crypto assets continue to establish themselves now more than a decade into their existence, this view looks more and more like a trivial dismissal similar to thinking the Internet would not amount to much beyond a step up from a fax machine.

Much more likely is that if crypto investors are left holding the bag the value has melted away from investors flowing to the benefit of all of society in general. Tyler Cowen made this case recently in his Bloomberg column:

So you can be bullish on crypto’s future without being bullish on current crypto prices. For a simple analogy, Spotify and YouTube have greatly expanded music’s reach, but overall the price of recorded music has fallen, and many performers earn much less than did their peers in the LP era. Or consider the agriculture sector, defined broadly: It has done very well over the last few centuries, but food prices have fallen rather than risen, due to higher output and greater competition.

I consider the unable-to-capture-worth scenario the serious, thoughtful worry. There are many ways this almost certainly will be true if crypto pans out for the long haul. You can make a great living as a bathroom remodeler or a plumber, but you aren't coming anywhere close to capturing all the value to consumers of indoor plumbing. 

If crypto investing fails, I think it will fail despite succeeding as a technology rather than because of it failing to ever deliver.

 

P.S. I take it as a very positive sign for crypto assets that the serious ones (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.) are becoming more and more correlated with the performance of "real" financial assets like stocks and bonds. It is an unfortunate economic fact that assets tend to become more highly correlated together as they mature making investing more difficult as some of the benefits of diversification erode.

Knowing Your Business Means Knowing Your Costs

[Sister post to The Accountants Can't Make You Rich; consider this the counterpoint to that post.] 

To understand your business, you have to understand your costs--at a total, average, and incremental level. Many small businesses that would otherwise be successful fail for lack of this understanding. Think of a restaurant that clearly has a sufficient level of customers but that nonetheless closes its doors permanently. 

To be sure, many businesses manage to stay alive and in some cases thrive despite anyone understanding their fundamentals, but these examples are rare and fleeting. More often what seems to be operators flying blind are actually people with some combination of magnificent instincts and great muscle memory honed by years at the treacherous helm. 

Truly understanding the underlying drivers of costs unlocks the ability to guide all manner of vital decisions: what to make and how much, how to shrink when necessary, where you can discount and where you cannot, where to expand operations and what to expect from growth, etc.

Cost per the relevant unit is as essential as it is boring to all but a few of us, an elite group who relish mastering the concept. The good news is there are only two difficult parts to that equation, but the bad news is the same. 

Cost is an elusive concept. Defining cost properly is where economics meets accounting. Here we must understand variable versus fixed costs, marginal versus average versus total costs, the thresholds of cost expansion/contraction (At what point of production must we build an entirely new production plant? If we shutdown a production line, how are costs affected?), cost drivers and probable variances, etc.

Defining the unit(s) that is relevant is the art of cost accounting. For example in hotels it starts with the units for sale as seen in the revenue metric REVPAR (revenue per available room). While there are other important metrics beyond that one in that particular industry, the available room is foundational since that is the essence of what a hotel is selling.* 

In defining the relevant units we must understand if the units are variable or fixed, if the units are fully or partially or not at all under our control, how the units behave independent of cost (think of seasonality, etc.), when certain costs (or revenues) do and do not apply to various units. In the last case consider a restaurant where the cost applied per table seat available might be separated from the cost applied per bar seat available even though we would still want to look at them in totality. Hence a mythical unit might be created to synthetically mimic the real units on an aggregate basis--e.g., cost per customer spot available.

Not complicated enough? Add in a dimension of time. Open a restaurant an hour longer each night--do your relevant units change? Cost certainly will. Depends on how you define units given the objective you're trying to actually measure. 

From cost we next need to know revenue from which point we can understand profit. Allow me to illustrate using a personal anecdote from my time as a financial analyst at a newspaper. 

One of the reasons I was hired was to understand the cost and revenue drivers as profit margins had begun shrinking in the industry. I like to say that a fat profit margin hides a lot of bad decisions. The newspaper industry was no exception. Quite a few things were able to be tried that once a thorough analysis was conducted turned out to not be as successful as expected or believed to be. This isn't a bad indictment per se. Success in business is built on a mountain of well-placed failures. 

Of all the things I was asked to do, I was never explicitly asked to determine the specific attribution of the company's profits--meaning what lines of business were profitable. Yet this seemed a natural thing to want to know. In fact it fascinated me. To everyone else it was obvious or uninteresting. They simply "knew" what was profitable. Profits were so big, heck, everything was profitable, right? That was intuitive to some but not to me. My intuition was the opposite--I knew that it would be highly unusual for everything that went into a bundled product to be profitable in the sense of direct attribution. 

There seemed to be two biases at work: a fear of knowing the answer (what if my area isn't profitable?) and a lack of critical thinking (look at how much revenue this generates/this is an essential part of the business; it must be profitable). 

Once I achieved a strong understanding of the company's cost, it became apparent that everything simply could not be profitable. There were vast differences in revenue by various business lines but very little differences in properly allocated costs. Applying revenue minus cost (i.e., profit) business line by business line would "use up" the profit before all the areas were covered. Before mentioning the areas that were profitable, a caveat is needed. The newspaper was a bundled product meaning everyone got the main section, the sports section, the monthly special sections, the inserts, the classifieds, etc. A point of near religious dogma in the industry was how vital nearly all of these components were to a successful bundle. So I was both risking heresy as well as producing an analysis that the very cost-conscious management team might misinterpret much to its own demise. Loss leaders is a very real and healthy business practice as is cross subsidization. But these concepts can also be co-opted to excuse bad mistakes were money is lost for no actual indirect gain.

Everything wasn't profitable. Out of nearly a hundred different product lines and sublines, only four areas accounted for 100% of the profit of the business: preprint inserts, national ROP ads (when a company like American Airlines ran a full-page newsprint ad), color ink (a big upsale item), and employment ads in the classified section. This meant all the other ads in the main, sports, business, and other newsprint sections including special sections were losing money. All the rest of the classified section outside of employment ads were losing money--ad areas like traditional for-sale listings, automotive ads, real estate ads, etc. The circulation revenue was not covering costs. Subscribers were not paying enough to cover the cost of delivery much less any content production. 

The entirety of this analysis was not a complete surprise to the seasoned people at the helm of the paper, but the details were revealing and eye-opening. To repeat and be fair, this did not mean that people like the guys selling automotive ads weren't adding value--they certainly were. But what they were adding was content value much like the guys writing the sports columns. The upshot was that a limited decision-making mantra could have been "How will it help increase preprints, national ROP, color, or employment ads?" If the answer was "it wouldn't", the right decision would be to reject the proposal.

Knowing cost is not easy; so a good deal of respect is owed the business people of the world who work hard to master it. This might start with the cost accountants I was slighting in the prior post, and it certainly ends with all those entrepreneurs, business middle managers, and captains of industry toiling away so cost is never unknown.

*There are always exceptions. Some hotels are selling experiences outside of the room itself. The room might not correspond tightly to variable costs or to revenue. However, usually even when there are multiple lines of business (think Las Vegas hotels), these still are broken down per available room as it corresponds to cost and revenue as tightly as any other unit.

The Accountants Can't Make You Rich

In business cost per unit may be the ultimate metric. Accountants focus on in decreasing the numerator. Marketers focus on increasing the denominator. 

It is important to remember, though, that cost containment is not a growth strategy. Accountants almost never remember this. However, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for long-term success. This is true of economies, firms, and individuals. In a future post I will explore this giving the importance of the metric its due.

You can't grow your wealth by harvesting investment losses--you can't just "write it off" after all. Reducing unnecessary costs is an important part of sustaining a firm, but it is not a complete recipe of a succeeding firm. This is why so many mergers and acquisitions fail to add value. Cost reductions through economies of scale are generally very difficult to realize, and even when they are realized, they are often temporary. Ultimately, successful mergers come down to realizing synergies for new growth without cost exploding. Compounding the problem of pulling off a successful merger (one that justifies the purchase price of the target being acquired) is that the hoped-for synergies prove in many cases to be imaginary and as often unforeseen at the outset--more luck than skill.

Looked at from a broader view, a society with high savings and poor investment will be an impoverished people who are soon forgotten. To be clear the alternative isn't simply live for today, but at least those of the Bacchanalia had a good time while it lasted. The miser who squirrels away his every penny under the mattress has nothing to show but a desire for yesterday's purchasing power.

The cost reduction impetus gets maximized in a recessionary environment. Firms and individuals tend to look inward in times of economic stress thinking more and more about how to voluntarily shrink to avoid forced shrinking. This can be both helpful and healthy. Yet taken to extreme, which can come quite easily, this becomes a self-fulfilling feedback loop. 

The cutbacks one should make are reductions in consumption. This is a lot easier at the individual and family level than at the firm level. Firms shouldn't have "consumption" per se. To the degree they do this is simply excess that should be trimmed away in any environment--easier said than done of course. Investment choices may and likely should change given changes to near-term outlooks. At the same time the risk of overcorrection is very great. 

An asset allocation should be largely immune to changes in the investment near term. The investors "going to cash", "moving to the sidelines", and selling out otherwise in times of stress in the financial markets are almost always making critical mistakes. Sometimes those mistakes are permanently devastating. 

Back to the general concept of keeping the accounting department happy, accountants usually aren't thinking in terms of calculus--only calculations. What I mean by that is they aren't looking at rates of change and the signs on the derivatives. Lest we degrade them unnecessary, the marketing department's version of calculations can amount to astrology mixed with magical wishes. At least the accountants are doing real math.

Those exaggerations aside keeping an eye on cost is essential. Focusing entirely on cost is deadly.

Choose: Stocks and Bonds or Bitcoin and Cash

Over lunch this past week an interesting hypothetical was posed. Suppose you were offered one of the following, which would you choose: 

• One million dollars in some initial combination of your choosing between stocks and bonds (fully-indexed, total market coverage), or
• One million dollars in some initial combination of your choosing between Bitcoin and cash (U.S. dollars).

You will be forced to lock it in for 10 years with no changes to it or any ability to borrow against it. After the 10-year period is up, it is yours free and clear (no taxes either at that point).

Without too much thinking or much hesitation, I chose Bitcoin and cash in a 50/50 combination. My wiser colleagues said with as much or more conviction stocks and bonds--I don't recall their combinations if they stated them. Since I am the investment guy, this raised eyebrows. Maybe I'm just also the gambler. To be sure I caveated my decision with the disclaimer that I might change my mind (my guess was low conviction). To be fair the others did similarly but with perhaps a bit less hesitation (somewhat higher conviction).

In general I would assume that all four of us in this conversation are of very similar financial standing adjusted for our ages (there is about a 30-year spread from youngest to oldest). There is not a right or wrong answer on this question--at least not without a lot more information about each chooser including several underlying assumptions (risk tolerance, liquidity needs, expectations about each person's future goals and paths of life, etc.). I don't wish to get into speculation about that here nor try to evaluate the soundness of any starting position. 

What I am interested in is exploring further how we might frame such a tradeoff. One additional outcome from this exercise is thinking about what assumptions one would make about critical variables and the implications of those assumptions. 

Some people would very appropriately, for themselves, choose an allocation of 100% cash. We could argue about that, but again only by digging deeper into their goals and risk tolerance among other things. "Hey, I'll take free money and I want to know it will be basically there for me at the end of the rainbow (inflation be dammed!)." That is potentially a sensible position, but we could write a book (many books have been written) about what extreme conditions must be in place for that to be rational. Geez, I better stop now or that will be this post . . .

So let's just assume we are debating only the question of which outcome has the best highest expected value after 10 years. I strike "best" because that implies more than just the math problem I want to explore.

We need just a few inputs: 

• expected returns of stocks, bonds, Bitcoin, and cash (I am assuming we can get some yield on cash rather than thinking of it as money under the mattress.)
• expected inflation (We are going to look at values in real terms so we don't let the cash option appear better than it actually is--a likely net loser to inflation.)
• probability of various outcomes (Using a range of expected returns we need to know how likely we think those are. The range is really only important for Bitcoin given its unknown future.)

I am going to use Vanguard's capital market assumptions (CMA) for expected returns of stocks, bonds, and cash as well as inflation. To make these always updating predictions evergreen in this post and because these are publicly available information as linked above, I will also post a picture of these below. Please do see Vanguard's website for more information including appropriate disclaimers. 

I am going to totally make up the expected returns for Bitcoin because 1) my guess is as good as yours and 2) the devil is in the probability and the relative outcome versus the others--my accuracy is nearly immaterial if I am in the ballpark. 

Before you dismiss any of this upon glancing at the inflation prediction (range 1.6% - 2.6%), understand that these are 10-year predictions. I hope they are right given what this implies going forward given currently very high inflation rates, but it can easily be the case even with some persistence of current inflation (8% for a year (not that bad yet) plus 5% for a year plus 8 years at 1.6% would land us at the high range).

Note that I am looking at true total market coverage in stocks (U.S. and all international), thus I will combine the growth rates below in the proportion 55/45 U.S./Int'l. Note also that I am only using U.S. bonds in the model. I generally like some international bonds, but I will make this limiting assumption. Regardless, U.S. versus Int'l bond returns are pretty close as you can see in the details below and at the link.

Enough of that already, let's model this thing.

Here is version 1:

I am putting my thumb on the scale to be optimistic about traditional asset returns (stocks and bonds)  making the low case 25% likely and the high case 75% likely, which serves to put my initial Bitcoin/cash choice at a disadvantage. For Bitcoin I am assuming total collapse in the low-end prediction versus only 25% annual growth in the high-end version. I say only as this isn't "to the moon" although it is very strong growth indeed. Keep in mind that Bitcoin has averaged about 94% annual growth over the past 5 years through to today's price of about $38,300. While being conservative? on the high-end growth rate, perhaps I am not appropriately discounting the likelihood of the high side putting it at a 20% chance. I will change that assumption in the next model. 

But just before that, let me explain why I don't think we need to worry about the mixing and matching between individual high and low estimates (e.g., stocks grow at 6.1% while bonds only grow at 1.9% or stocks and bonds are high but Bitcoin and cash are low, etc.). Assets tend to be positively correlated over longer and longer timeframes. Even though stocks and bonds enjoy some degree of poor correlation, these fade away over time as what is good for stocks (a productive, growing economy) is also good for bonds. Likewise, a world that has Bitcoin doing well probably has stocks doing well, and a world where inflation is low, stock and bond returns are also probably low. Regardless, the heart of the debate isn't going to be impacted by these details. 

Here is version 2:

Ouch! Even though I made the low-high range for stocks and bonds 50/50, the move to make low to high outcomes 95/5 for Bitcoin destroys that option. But if that is really more like the future likelihood of the outcome range for Bitcoin, perhaps stronger return possibilities on the high end are as well. So . . .

Here is version 3: 

I greatly increased the growth rate for Bitcoin using 38.6% annual growth. This isn't a randomly chosen number. This would correspond to a Bitcoin price of approximately $1,000,000, which some roughly project as a possible destination (who knows?). Regardless, stocks and bonds still look better. So let's do just two more for the sake of good order . . .

Here is version 4:

The only change here is to make the Bitcoin high possibility a little more likely moving it from 5% to 10%. And wow! Look how sensitive the difference result is to this change. Obviously this should come as no surprise as this whole thing is about Bitcoin's high end. I guess we could run just one more taking a look at a more moderate Bitcoin but also a less than total bust low-end for it.

Finally, here is version 5:

So, allowing for a Bitcoin future in any future (low end is 10% annual decline in value) gives us a fairly strong case for my gamble on some combination of Bitcoin and cash. 

Having gone through this process would I now change my mind? I will stick with 50/50 Bitcoin and cash. But that strongly suggests a question: how can I justify that choice given that I don't have an existing portfolio that looks anything like that. I am personally overwhelmingly "boring" with an almost all-stock portfolio with just a bit of crypto sprinkled in. 

At the risk of a slight digression into the post I keep promising this will not be, allow me to defend my rationality. This hypothetical is a forced gamble. My retirement investments are different in that regard. Those I can and do change periodically including both allocation as well as contribution. I get to guide those and adjust them. The hypothetical gift invested is a Ron Popeil "set it and forget it". Part of why I cannot invest more in Bitcoin (aside from it wisely not being a 401(k) option (looking right at you, Fidelity)) is that I likely cannot tolerate the variance. If I can get in and get out of it, I am as more likely to make the wrong in/out moves as the right ones. And that is before the tax-drag effect. 

Besides that, my investment reality is the retirement assets I actually do have. This hypothetical is a lottery ticket idea. If I win the lottery, my reality materially would change. I could afford more and different risk. In this sense and surprisingly, if the hypothetical was $10,000 in stocks and bonds versus Bitcoin and cash, the rational decision for me might have been stocks and bonds! Whereas the typical person would say, "that is too little to worry about the risk, let it ride!", I would counter, "I can't afford to take the the riskiness of Bitcoin at that magnitude ($10,000)." Along this one dimension, I would be right. 

I want exposure to big upsides. Unfortunately, these are difficult to find and doubly difficult to stick with. In a sense this thought experiment has revealed some of my own limitations on putting my money where my mind and heart and mouth are. 

-----

Mr. Blandings Builds His Dream Portfolio

Imagine being an architect for a couple wanting to build a dream house. Their sentiment and emotions would influence what they asked for, but your job  includes a need to keep them within reason (not too big (or fancy) and not to small (or modest in terms of amenities)—basically Goldilocks).

Now image that they want to argue with you about how certain features should look, about how large certain rooms need to be, about what it takes to be within code and best practices, even about structural and engineering issues. Now complicate it by making yourself somewhat unsure about some of these answers and downright ignorant about the underlying truth of, say, why certain designs will likely work better for structural integrity than others. You must win the initial bid and keep their confidence throughout the project without misleading them or giving them what they think they want without regard to the tradeoffs, the downsides.

Financial management and financial planning is a lot about being the architect and general contractor for some principal (individuals, families, organizations, et al.) who probably wants more than they can reasonably afford and wants to achieve it with unreasonable certainty. Being a financial advisor means always having to say you're sorry.

This is not a rant. Clients are trusting you with their money--potentially all of their financial wealth. For many like individual retirees this will be all their potential wealth too because they are no longer able to work. For others their capacity not to mention willingness to go back into the workforce would leave them only with a fraction of the wages they are entrusting you to earn for them with, let me remind you, their money. They may not know what they do not know, but part and parcel with that is they do not know it. 

Oh, and one more thing: you as their advisor may not know what you think you know about them. It is a continual discovery process seeking to learn and refine and revise what goals they are trying to achieve and what constraints and risk tolerances they are subject to. 

Good car mechanics know a lot about fixing cars and keeping them running well. They know basically nothing about where you should drive. London cabbies know how to get you where you want to go (in London). They cannot know if you should want to go there.

Humility and honesty are essential attributes of a good advisor (financial and otherwise). They are among the necessary conditions for potential success along with actual skill in the area of advisement, good communication, and ability to establish and keep trust. Most clients are know they want the latter qualities in an advisor (skill, communication, trust), but in many cases they give little to no importance to the former (humility and honesty). In fact those often repel rather than attract clients. Add overcoming this bias to that which separates beneficial, successful advisors from charlatans and quacks. 

Rather Sorry Than Safe

When friends who are interested in "prepping" ask me about planning for doomsday scenarios, I love the looks on their faces when I reply, "I'm planning on being one of the attacking barbarians ravaging the countryside. Thanks for telling me about your hideout." 

Let's consider the perspective of a prepper in regards to prepping for financial disaster. There are always reasons to be fearful about the future, and it doesn't take too much imagination to spin these true risks into worry of cataclysm. As I write, worries about the COVID-19 pandemic are gradually fading only to be replaced by concern of war with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine.* 

If you don't have a back-up plan, you are naively gallivanting about while the asteroid circles the planet. Yet if you always hunker down in the bomb shelter, you are letting your fears prevent you from enjoying life. Risk inconsistency can be worse than consistent, willful exposure to high risk. If you are prepared for and understand that actions you are taking are likely risking bankruptcy for the chance to strike it rich and possibly very rich, then the risk you are taking may very well be prudent and necessary. Extremely few entrepreneurial efforts with appropriate upside potential do not inherently contain that kind of downside risk. But if you are running a decent risk of bankruptcy just through your spending patterns and arbitrary investment decisions, you are likely not getting enough reward for the risk. In a more technical sense you are not matching potential return with the level of risk. 

Return is the expected compensation for risk taken. It is not guaranteed nor predetermined. A lot can get in the way and almost always it is a spectrum of potential returns (some of them low if not negative) that result in the expected return. Sometimes we qualify return compensation in terms of a required rate of return. Required can really be thought of as minimum acceptable expected return. In highly efficient markets this required return becomes equal to the expected return as any potential return above this required level gets competed away.

Successful decision making in life as with successful investing is not about avoiding risk or taking risk. It is about understanding and managing the many varied risks one is exposed to while getting the proper potential compensations. 

We simply cannot predict the future nor can we entirely remove our exposure to it as good and bad as it will be. Well, I guess there is one way, but if that is your solution, this post isn't for you at all. For those of us who want to go prudently into that good night, remember the old adage:

Don't try to hedge the end of the world. It's only gonna happen once, and regardless of what you do, it won't work out too well for you.

*Calvin: You're sure?

Adam: Positive. The Soviet Union collapsed without a shot being fired. The Cold War is over.

Calvin: That's what everybody believes?

Adam: Yes, sir. It's true.

Calvin: What? Did the Politburo just one day say, "We give up?"

Adam: Yes. That's kind of how it was.

Calvin: Uh-huh.

Calvin: My gosh, those Commies are brilliant! You've got to hand it to 'em! "No, we didn't drop any bombs! Oh yes, our evil empire has collapsed! Poor, poor us!" I bet they've even asked the West for aid! Right?

Adam: Uh, I think they have.

Calvin: Hah! Those cagey rascals! Those sly dissemblers! Those, uh... They've finally pulled the wool over everybody's eyes!

--"Blast From The Past" via IMDB

Justifying Bitcoin (and Crypto) Prices

Steve Landsburg recently asked on his blog for anyone to offer plausible reasons for why cryptocurrency should have any value at all beyond just being in a speculative bubble. (Aside, you can tell how behind I am in my reading, etc. by the date of this reply.) 

Here is what I left as a comment serving as my attempts.

Attempt #1: Suppose Steve decides he wants to retire and move to Paradise Island. He plans to liquidate his assets including current real estate to purchase a dream place on the beach. He is not alone as many are contemplating and acting toward just such a move. At the same time current real estate owners on Paradise Island are looking to cash in on the land run by selling existing places including raw land. Unfortunately, many scamsters abound looking to take advantage of a key information asymmetry--namely, that it is extremely difficult to determine who actually holds title to actual land. Fortunately, there is one source (a cryptocurrency ledger) that can validate with complete certainty which of these are legitimate sellers and therefore legitimate potential transactions giving Steve (and all others) good title to any purchase. [Note: While this is an extreme case, adjusting for real-world frictions and the availability of alternative solutions simply lowers rather than extinguishes the value of the ledger.]

Attempt #2: Octan Corporation is a multinational firm with extensive interests throughout the globe. As such it has continual needs to transfer liquid assets (call it money) between subsidiary accounts and with arms-length third-parties all of which can be domiciled in different states and nations with custody at various third-party firms. In the current/old world this is costly in a number of respects: It has limited availability since banking systems are open only at certain times and days of the week, it is slow since the clearing process is built on old architecture with a cumbersome and time-intensive trust/verification procedure, and it is explicitly expense in fees as a result of these prior two reasons as well as the regulatorily-driven limited competition for these services. In the world of cryptocurrency these costs are substantially reduced. Literally Octan can send $1,000,000,000 across the world at 11:59 PM on a Saturday completing the transaction in 10 minutes for <1/100th of current wire costs in fees.

Attempt #3: Steve has many opinions and predictions about the world. Unfortunately, talk is cheap. Many dispute his contentions with vigor. However, Steve is actually very often correct. To his frustration Steve's detractors seem to vanish once the reality plays out in Steve's favor. And even if they are around for Steve to claim victory, they usually move the goalposts rarely admitting defeat. This among so many other facts like lack of liquid collateral or basic counterparty risk means ex ante bets are rarely able to be made. Fortunately, cryptocurrency allows trustless contracts to be written between these parties creating vast potential markets and submarkets for predictions and hedging. 

Attempt #4: Steve loves using his credit and debit cards. He is a "points guy" who has the obsessive hobby of finding and exploiting all the various opportunities including arbitrages that exist for non-cash transaction rewards programs (e.g., frequent flyer miles bonuses, cash-back rewards, etc.). Steve is like all consumers, though, in that he doesn't like transactions fees. Fortunately for Steve, many of these fees for him are being cross-subsidized by naïve customers who are not maximizing their points if using credit/debit cards at all. The fees are transactions costs representing the true costs of validating and facilitating financial transactions. These add up to hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Fortunately, cryptocurrency offers the potential to cut these costs dramatically by creating "trustless" alternative clearing options. It is trustless in that the two or more parties to the transaction do not have to know each other as the network ledger validates the funds going from A to B are both good and compete (irreversible). [Note: While today transactions on various crypto networks like Bitcoin seem painfully slow (minutes or longer), there are options of subnetworks that can reduce these to seconds. Also in anticipation of a common objection, the price volatility risk can be eliminated by adding entry/exit transactions for both parties on both ends of the crypto exchange (e.g., dollars for Bitcoin for customer A, Bitcoin transfer from A to B, Bitcoin for dollars (or other) for seller B.).]

The Rules of Investing Club

1. Stay invested - Don’t time the market. Timing the market is not just impossible. It is multiplicatively destructive in two ways: bad decisions compound mathematically and the likelihood of mistake compounds with attempts.
• Sub-rule - Know what this means. It applies when the market is “down” and when it is “up”. What makes you think you can define these? What makes you think you’ll both get it right on the exit/entry (at least twice) and have the nerve to make the proper moves at that time. Also, wouldn’t timing imply buying low? So why are you bailing after a crash?... oh, because even though you didn’t see the downturn coming up until this point, you now can see definitively that a further decline lies ahead.
2. Keep a cash reserve equal to X months expenses - X is up to you. A typical rule is 6 months, but mileage will vary. Be sure to include access to credit as a buffer as long as you also take into account that the event that causes you to tap into this safety reserve might also be damaging your credit access. Notice how this rule helps with adhering to the first rule.
3. Diversify - The only "free lunch" in investing as it allows for (some) risk reduction without return reduction (up to a point) when done properly.
4. Outsource - SPIVA. You ain’t special and just about no one else is either. Therefore, use well-run, low-cost, TRUE index funds. (Besides Vanguard, Fidelity and Schwab are also typically good providers.)
5. Do what it takes to stay on plan - Employ dollar-cost averaging (DCA) or enroll in forced (passive) contribution increases or use a professional as a commitment partner.
• Sub-rule - Make sure the pro has incentives that are congruent with your own, has the right credentials (CFA and CFP being the gold standards but experience matters a lot too), and is cost competitive. 

Elaborate Investing versus Adaptive Investing

When investing, be careful not to confuse complicated with complex. 

My inspiration for this post came from reading this essay by Arnold Kling a few years back where he elaborates on a longer essay by Jordan Hall that draws a distinction between complicated and complex. Hall sets the terms:

...[I]n brief the distinction is that a complicated system is defined by a finite and bounded (unchanging) set of possible dynamic states, while a complex system is defined by an infinite and unbounded (growing, evolving) set of possible dynamic states.

Kling's treatment is very helpful as he extends the concept to economics and climate:

When I was a graduate student in economics in the late 1970s, we were trained as if the economy is complicated, but not complex. We were told that if we learned enough mathematics and statistics and applied these tools, then eventually we could predict and control economic outcomes. 

In fact, economic behavior is complex. There are too many causal factors, feedback loops, non-linear effects, and unprecedented phenomena involved to enable economists to control the economy precisely and reliably.

....

Climate scientists use computer models, because the problems with which they deal are complicated. But there are multiple models, and they do not agree with one another. That tells me that the climate, like the economy, is complex. There are too many causal factors, feedback loops, non-linear processes, and unprecedented phenomena involved to enable precise and reliable prediction and control.

In contrast, landing a spacecraft on the moon is merely complicated. It is a very difficult problem, but we can arrive at a determinate solution.

I would like to extend this model to the investing world especially from the standpoint of the typical buy-side* investor (AKA, you and me and most all of us). 

The money management world loves to overcomplicate things. This is because overcomplication gives a mystique or air of superiority to the wise, benevolent (expensive) investment professional. It also conveniently provides a nice cover for when things don't go so well. As an aside I believe this is a very big part of the investment world's embrace of ESG--perhaps to be expanded upon in a future post.

At the same time that they are embracing overcomplication, they are riding in like valiant knights to save the day. This is not to say that investing is simple. Investing is complicated, but that complication and solutions designed to solve it are not the full story. 

If it were just complicated, Wall Street would have solved investing long ago. And it wouldn't have needed a retail investor's money to do so. Investing is complex. This follows naturally from economic behavior including the economic actors and forces within it being complex. Consider a single stock.

We can attempt to value a stock based on a number of different, widely used, credible models (e.g., dividend discounting, free cash flow to equity, multiple of price to book, multiple of price to sales, etc.). These formulations are complicated to a certain degree and can be made more complicated with arguable improvement to the output. What should give us immediate pause is that each of these will almost always yield a meaningfully different answer. 

Each model will rely on assumptions, and those assumptions will have their own underlying complications. No matter how hard we try, all the king's computers and all the king's CFAs cannot definitively (precisely and accurately) value a single stock let alone the market as a whole. The best one could hope to do is be right more often than not to a slight but still meaningful degree. Very few highly incentivized, very well funded pros can actually do this. And even they fade with time. 

The nature of investing being complex is not simply complication layered upon complication. It is of another dimension entirely. Economic value is ultimately subjective value. It is subject to preferences, tastes that change in unpredictable ways. It is also subject to random events that spawn new, unforeseen paths of development. There are future technologies of which we have not even dreamed and for which all of the physical ingredients are currently before us. 

Those in money management on the sell-side* offer the comfortable refuge of 'solving' the complicated. This is dangerous even if unintentionally deceptive. Investing is never solved. It is constantly evolving both from the standpoint of the market external to the investor as well as the investor's own financial goals and risk preferences. Consider the latter an additional layer of complexity with its own complications. 

The solution to complex challenges is flexibility. A good financial plan must be adaptive. Elaborate schemes alone will not save it from peril. If anything, they may give a false sense of security along with crippling high costs. Start with straightforward guiding principles, and follow with constant reassessment: What are you trying to achieve? What is at risk? What is the current probability of success/failure? What are the magnitudes of those potential outcomes? How confident should you be in these estimates? What if you're wrong?

Appreciation for the complexity of investing means looking beyond solutions for the merely complicated. 

*In traditional industry parlance the buy-side refers to those purchasing investments especially investment products. This could include buying a mutual fund or investing money with a more involved manager. The sell-side is of course those on the other side of the trade selling the investment fund or services. The ultimate buy-side investor is the principal owner of the account--the one who's money is being invested. She may hire a money manager to act as agent for her. It would be his job to take on the role of buy-side investor facing those looking to sell investments to him (ultimately her). So for him it can be confusing since he is selling to his client his services to buy on her behalf. In the industry he is always considered buy-side. The firms he invests his clients' money with are the sell-side. Many a principal-agent problem develops when the buy-side doesn't stay prudently arms length from the sell-side. Think of it as the financial world equivalent of the McD.L.T.