A Price Paradox

This is a continuation of my previous post "Markets Don't Hate Uncertainty".

Don’t think about the stock market like you do for a specific good like, say, bananas. If a large group of the banana-consuming public suddenly decides they don’t like bananas very much anymore, the demand curve for banana shifts massively to the left meaning market prices will fall greatly and future quantities produced/consumed will too--remember the immediate supply curve is nearly vertical and the long run supply curve is much closer to horizontal.

However, that is not the case for stocks. The value of stocks is determined by the net present value of future cash flows. In simple terms: Buying a stock means being a part owner of a company. As an owner you are entitled to a share of future profits (eventually paid out as dividends--a reasonable, simplifying assumption). Those profits come in the future, so we have to value them today at a discount since a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow--the so called time value of money (TVM). Adding up all future cash flows individually discounted for how far out into the future they are gives us a figure for net present value (NPV). This is the "value" of the stock, which should equal its price. Let's assume for now there is no uncertainty about expected future profits.

An essential premise in the banana hypothetical is that the value of bananas has plummeted. Remember value is always a subjective concept. Suppose a large demographic group like the Baby Boomers in aggregate start reducing their desire to hold equity investments (stocks), it is not because they don’t believe in the value of stocks in general. Rather it is likely due to the fact they don’t want to have an asset exposure so much tied to the volatility associated with stocks. So they want to reduce their investment holdings in stocks. So in one sense there is no reason to believe that their selling activity should materially change the price of stocks because the investment value of stocks (NPV of future cash flows) is unchanged in the market overall.

But they are trying to sell, and their selling has to be met by buyers. In order to find a willing buyer they should have to offer a more attractive (lower) price than the current price. Hence, we have a paradox--prices shouldn't change but they have to change. The solution lies in a reframing of what investors are trying to achieve. They don't want stocks for the sake of stocks--this would be the banana model. They don't want the future cash flows per se--those are only attractive relative to the price paid for them given the risk associated with realizing them. They want the expected return--the future cash flows purchased at an appropriate price today adjusted for the risk.

So in order for Baby Boomers to sell their stocks they have to increase the expected return of stocks from the perspective of the buyer. Since they can't affect the future cash flows, they have to do one of two things: Either lower their prices to attract buyers or find buyers with different discount rates (buyers who don't value a dollar today as much as a dollar tomorrow). Realize, we are still assuming no disagreement about the expected future cash flows. That wrinkle is not needed to explain this hypothetical or the paradox. Everyone can agree on the expected future cash flows and still people want to exchange their positions (i.e., Baby Boomers want to sell and reduce market risk and buyers want to take on that risk).

Here is the graphical way to think about those two options available to the stock-selling Baby Boomers:

The colored lines B and C represent the change in price over time. The slope of these lines is the expected return. In the first case (top chart) prices today decline along path A and the lower price after Baby Boomers try to sell stocks implies a higher expected return for all stock investors. The market's expected return has increased from the slope of line B to the slope of line C.

In the second case (bottom chart) the difference in how each investor discounts the future price implies a different rate of return. Baby Boomers selling stocks have an expected return of B and buyers of their stock have an expected return of C. (Note: This is related to but not dependent upon Baby Boomers having a shorter life expectancy than buyers. The buyer can be the exact same demographically as long as they have a different discount rate. When compared to the stock-selling Baby Boomers, the buyers value a dollar tomorrow as being closer to the value of a dollar today. Boomers can be selling to other Boomers with lower discount rates.)

You should be feeling uneasy about this for two reasons:

1. Why don't prices today equal that far-off future price? Didn't we assume there is no disagreement about the amount of future cash flows?
2. In the second chart why wouldn't this have already come to fruition? Did stock-selling Baby Boomers suddenly just now increase their discount rates?

The answer to the first objection is this. Even if we assume there is no disagreement about expected future cash flows, there is a degree of uncertainty for them; hence the word "expected". The compensation a buyer/holder of stock receives for risk of investing is the expected return--technically speaking, the equity risk premium. 

Assume a stock will pay a dividend next year equal to all of its assets and profits and then cease to exist. All market participants agree that the dividend next year will be either $0 or $2 per share and that the probability of each outcome is 50%. In that case the expected future cash flow is $1 next year. This means the stock today is worth $1 before any TVM discounting. Once the year has passed and the dividend realized, investors will either have $0 or $2 to show for the $1 they put at risk by buying the stock. Therefore, the future price has to be something greater than the current price or no one would be interested in risking the investment.

The answer to the second objection is a little less elegant. Well, basically we have to be assuming Baby Boomers wanting to sell stock have increased their discount rate (i.e., become more risk averse). Otherwise, we can't have the hypothetical. But this leaves another problem: Why isn't there just one expected return in the market? Well, there is, but in the second chart we are breaking up the market into two segments. The blend of the two lines B and C would be the market expected return. That would be some new line D with a new destination in between the two lines B and C. 

So, what is the solution to the paradox? Will prices change? And if so, did the value of stocks change?

The answer is another paradox: Stock prices changed by going down because stock value went up so stock prices could come down because stock value had to go up.

Baby Boomers in this hypothetical all of a sudden wanted less stock because they wanted less risk. In order to reduce risk they have to sell that risk to someone else. That someone else either must want that same risk relatively more all of a sudden (the source of the second objection to the bottom chart mentioned above) or the Baby Boomers need to reduce the risk by offering a lower price. Some of both will happen meaning stocks get less risky simply because Baby Boomers want less risk--a rather surprising result. Here are the implications:

• The lower the price of stocks, the less risky they are holding expected cash flows and discount rates constant.
• The change of ownership from higher-discount rate investors (Baby Boomers all of a sudden in our hypothetical) to lower-discount rate investors (the buyers of the Baby Boomer's stock) means stocks are less risky to those who now hold stock without any needed change in price or expected future cash flows. 
• Stocks become more valuable when prices go down without any other change or expected future cash flows go up without any other change or discount rates go down without any other change. 
• If expected future cash flows go down and discount rates go up (as has been the case circa March 2020), then prices must go down. 

The moral to this story could be: DON'T REASON FROM A PRICE CHANGE! Prices reflect value. Value for consumption goods and services like bananas and hotel rooms are subjective. Value for financial investment assets like stocks, bonds, and real estate are subjective too. But they are subject to expectations about the future and the value we place on money today versus money tomorrow.

Prices don't simply change, and a change in price doesn't really tell us anything. The price of bananas declining could be because people stopped liking bananas as much or it could be because it just got a lot easier/cheaper to harvest bananas. The price decline tells us that the value of the next (marginal) banana is lower, but that fact by itself doesn't tell us why that is the case.

Stock prices declining could be because investors in aggregate think earnings from holding stocks will now be lower than estimated before or it could be because investors in aggregate value money today more than money tomorrow. The price decline in stocks tells us that on net one or both of these has happened, but the fact by itself doesn't tell us which.

Markets Don't Hate Uncertainty

Markets don’t hate uncertainty.

Markets aren’t sentient beings with feelings. It is much more meaningful and accurate to say markets price uncertainties and risks.

As uncertainty rises, markets adjust prices to reflect that information. As risk tolerance changes, markets adjust prices to incorporate that as well.

The current financial environment gives a helpful, extreme example. Lower prices for stocks are likely reflecting two things: increased risk aversion (higher discount rates) and greater uncertainty about future wealth creation (lower earnings/profits, lower quality of life).

Let's look at each of those causes. First, increased risk aversion: If the average person is becoming more fearful of the future, the rational response for them is to increase how much they value a dollar today as compared to a dollar tomorrow. Technically this means they discount the future by a higher rate than previously. They are raising their discounting rate in the formula:

Money Today = Money Tomorrow less a Discount

$0.90 = $1.00 minus $0.10

[slightly more technically]

Money Today = Money Tomorrow times a Discount Rate

$0.90 = $1.00 * 0.9

(even more technically, 0.9 is approximately a 11.1% discount rate)

If our previous discounting rate was $0.05 for every dollar tomorrow and now it is $0.10 for every dollar tomorrow, then the current value of that future dollar has declined $0.05. Prices today on that future dollar fall from 95 cents to 90 cents.

Second, greater uncertainty about future wealth creation: If the average person thinks that future generation of wealth is going to be less than previously thought, the rational response is to lower their expectations for the future. They are lowering the expectation of money tomorrow in the formula:

Money Today = Money Tomorrow less a Discount

$0.90 = $0.95 minus $0.05

If our previous expectation was to generate a full dollar tomorrow and now we fear tomorrow will only see the generation (creation) of 95 cents, then prices today on that future amount fall from 95 cents to 90 cents.

What happens when both happen at the same time? We then would see a compounding effect in prices today. 

What was once

Money Today = Money Tomorrow less a Discount

$0.95 = $1.00 times 0.95

Is now

$0.855 = $0.95 times 0.9

Prices for money today have fallen $0.095 ($0.95 - $0.855) or 10%.

These are the underlying forces that drive the more complex world in financial markets. Investments in equities (stocks) have fallen significantly in the past month. This is very likely an example of both increased discounting of the future (greater risk aversion) and lower prospects on future wealth creation (lower expected future earnings). The market isn't hating the uncertainty about how risky the world is or what future earnings will be. Rather very appropriately the market is repricing the expected value of what the future will be. 

In every moment that passes new information is revealed about the world. This information is an update to all the prior expectations we had. Some of those expectations get confirmed. Some of them get rejected. But that is too binary a way to look at it. Don't think about right and wrong in terms of predictions. Think about constant adjustment. When substantial new information comes to light like when a virus comes into the world, the virus becomes abnormally very serious, and a pandemic emerges, big adjustments to prices today on values tomorrow naturally and appropriately result. 

Choosing Your Neighbors

If I had my druthers, I would choose retired couples who are infatuated with my children. The advantages are numerous including:

• They'd be quiet.
• They'd keep an eye out.
• They'd keep their yard tidy.
• They'd dote on my children.
• They'd think I invented technology.
• They'd be dependable and predictable.

One might think I'd say sorority girls who enjoy their pool parties. Problems range from making me feel old and unattractive to finding me attractive and tempting me to throw away a lifetime for 30 minutes of bliss (or performance anxiety).

The reality is you can't choose your neighbors. And you probably wouldn't want to. Turns out those older retired couples have some bad qualities too. They are pretty good at minding your business. They are always up for conversation--ALWAYS. If they spot you in the yard, you are automatically in for a round of "Let's Talk About My Latest Doctor Visit". They know the neighborhood covenants extremely well including all the ones you are currently breaking, and they know that those covenants are not suggestions--they are serious dogma to be followed with strict religiosity. They like things as they are and better yet as they were and best yet as never changing.

There are no perfect neighbors. This documentary proves it.

Planning out and carefully choosing those around us would create a stale, uninspiring bubble world with high susceptibility to overrate the qualities we think we want and underrate those we think we want to avoid. Those biases would yield continuously disappointing results.

To a large degree you do get to pick your neighbors and they get to pick you. Our lives are characterized greatly by self selection. Fortunately it isn't the sole determining factor, though. New ideas, new opportunities, new methods: these things come from chance encounters and unplanned coordination and interaction.

Look at immigration as this microcosm writ large, and think about it from a purely selfish perspective. Every immigrant we discourage, turn away, or ban is another worker, another set of new ideas, another opportunity to discover something didn't know existed but now eagerly want.

Highly Linkable

Let's start with a trip out of town. Got your playlist ready? Sherman, to the Way Back Machine!

Read Jeffrey Tucker's sensible, thoughtful perspective on terrorism and its two great horrors.

Speaking of terrorism, here comes Adam to ruin everything. (HT: KPC)

A top candidate for the most disruptive technological breakthrough of the the next two decades is driverless (or less human driven) cars. The Atlantic has a good discussion of the two approaches driving this disruption.

Scott Sumner summarizes much of what is misunderstood in thinking about monetary economics. This is a bit wonkish, but keep in mind this: getting monetary policy correct is very probably VASTLY more important for your well-being than who wins the next presidential election. The combination of [insert the major candidate you are most opposed to] and good monetary policy is >>> [insert your favorite major candidate] and bad monetary policy. It is not even close.

The Market is a beautiful wonder, and the benefits of free exchange are truly immense. Consider as Cato at Liberty's Chelsea German points out discussing Andy George's projects how expensive a suit or perhaps a simple sandwich would be if we didn't have market exchange. When we limit The Market, we should do so with careful concern and minimal impact.

Assuming we cannot find a strongly compelling reason to prohibit an exchange, a good rule is: If you may do it for free, you may do it for money as Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski point out. This would include some outcomes that we might at first glance find troublesome but upon further inspection would analyze to be quite beneficial (albeit counterintuitive) as Liberty Street Economics points out when considering payday lending.

One of the key ways the market works its magic is through the price system. An effective market needs an effective price system. It is a remarkable method of capturing cost. Substitutes for that system are quite inferior as in the case Arnold Kling points out discussing locavorism.

Highly Linkable

Been travelling, so been behind. Some links to begin the catch up:

A podcast about when a teenage founder of a fictional company gets bought out for real money by the adults he "fired" for being too adult.

Expensive wine is for SUCKERS!

A wonderful example of how exploitable scientific study can be especially in the realm of health--study shows eating chocolate helps weight loss!

Speaking of food, a conversation with food historian (and contrarian) Rachel Laudan. One slice,

It´s to restore some sense of the benefits of modern food so that we do not waste time and energy trying to turn back the clock but can continue to improve our food system and disseminate those improvements as widely as possible.

Russ Roberts on recently being on Paul Krugman's bad side--I'm fully with Russ, of course.

Small but important steps on the road to education freedom.

Funny thing happened while we were wringing our hands over colony collapse disorder--the market (already) adapted to it minimizing the problem. (HT: Arnold Kling)

John Cochrane addresses one of the most fundamentally important questions in U.S. political economy--how to attain sustainable 4% annual economic growth. I fully (wistfully) endorse his short list of policy solutions.

Highly Linkable

Want to know how much better life is? Look to the Easter Bunny.

Water, water everywhere . . . before you get caught up in the hyperventilating panic, read this and listen to this. Thirsty for more? Try this and this and don't miss this including the block quote at the bottom from a reply to Mother Jones.

They weren't wanting for water at Woodstock as these rainmakers played on. (HT: Tyler Cowen)

Jeffrey Tucker blends up market confusion.

Arnold Kling offers some brief but vital points on sustainability properly considered under the wisdom of economics.

While we're on the subject of the environment, Ronald Bailey asks a great question with wide applicability, but in this case he focuses on global warming. I could make my thoughts on this a much longer post, but for now allow me to make four points:

• Climate change is a fact! Well, yes. But that is not the debate of substance. No serious thinker believes the climate is static. Many in the environmental movement seem to take as a given that the climate should not change, that species should not go extinct, that man most certainly should not alter his environment . . . in extreme conflict with evidence and reason. This emanates from a status quo (change-hating) bias in opposition to the scientific viewpoint of adaptation. The serious questions are more subtle. 
• It is important to understand what we can know versus what we most certainly cannot yet prove. Is the climate changing (evolving)? Yes. Are the actions of man partially responsible? Yes. Do we know how much? Not with any reasonable amount of precision. Can we make confident predictions of how the climate will be in the future? No, at best we can make a range of predictions resting on high sensitivity to a host of assumptions. Can we "solve" climate change? No, this kind of question is intellectually bankrupt.
• There are many implications behind possible climate futures. The good news is we won't be simply thrust into one via time warp. We will have time to continue to discover solutions to various problems including adapting to climates different than what we have become accustomed to as opposed to the impractical luxury of always avoiding those climate changes. Much of Florida might be underwater in 100 years. It is not obvious that Florida as currently conceived is morally superior to things that might significantly affect Florida in the future--assuming we even can pinpoint what those causal things are. Regardless, the future generations will most likely be fabulously wealthier than we are today. They will have resources that we cannot possibly dream of to resolve climate changes. 
• Beware top-down, all-powerful solutions. This is good advice almost always. Especially this is true when the problem is multifaceted and ill-defined. 

David Henderson has a very good grasp on freedom of association and its implications.

Here's an idea: take a super-powerful organization that is failing at two things and give them a third important task to fail at. Brilliant!

Megan McArdle shows two examples (one for the young and one for the old) where government is making systematic errors that WILL have colossally bad effects.

Highly Linkable

These people and their miniature worlds are so tiny. I'm crushing their heads! Be sure to hit the video at the end.

Megan McArdle asks us to take a moment to marvel at the kitchen wonders some of us (humans) enjoy today.

The rest of this link post is brought to you by Don Boudreaux (directly or via hat tips).

On the 69th anniversary of inexcusable brutality, Boudreaux asks us to remember and remember how conservatives felt about it at the time.

I relate very, VERY much to Sheldon Richman's sentiments in this post.

George Will rightfully takes to task those who would paint inverting corporations as unpatriotic. I love the conclusion:

This illustrates the grandstanding frivolity of the political class. It legislates into existence incentives for what it considers perverse behavior, and then waxes indignant when businesses respond sensibly to the incentives.

Matt Zwolinski has five important moral (and economic) points about payday lending.

The free market is filled with something even better than tolerance--indifference.

Here Boudreaux offers not just a strong argument against cronyistic policies like the Ex-Im Bank but also a strong argument against the minimum wage. To wit: why is it consumers' job (or in the case of the minimum wage, employers of low-wage employees' job) to compensate the "victims" of foreign subsidies (low wages)?

Just how dangerous is it to be a cop? Daniel Bier answers. (SPOILER ALERT: not very).

Highly Linkable

I've been on some of these. Perhaps I should set a goal to eventually be on each one. See if you can spot the one Forrest Gump was on. There is also one that looks a lot like the one where Joan Wilder first got into trouble (but it isn't the one; that one was in Mexico posing as Columbia).

Let's hit these by author in this edition:

First, Don Boudreaux makes quick work of the childish argument "If perfection is so good, why isn't anybody perfect?" Next, he points out something cool about keeping cool this summer.

Megan McArdle hits all the notes on why we need to end the corporate income tax. One quibble: I completely disagree with her idea of replacing it with higher taxes on capital gains/income. There is no logical or moral reason to tax the same thing twice and in a way that encourages wasteful consumption--taxing savings and investment encourages consumption today that otherwise would not take place.

Speaking of consumption, Scott Sumner points out that one implication of Piketty's wealth tax ideas would be wasteful consumption. Moving away from consumption, let's discuss aggregate demand, which isn't just consumption as Sumner points out. I know a lot of smart people who don't understand that they don't understand this concept.

Next time you're aggregate demanding you might want to use the retail version of Uber as detailed by Erika Morphy.

Finally, Timothy Taylor discusses the government's arrival on the scene of "The Great Honey Bee Panic of the 21st Century" (title all mine) just as the market is done making short work of the problem.

Nobody Puts A Rich Man In The Corner

You may remember that I claim to be wealthier than the richest man in the world from 100 years past. I came across an anecdote to support this thesis and provide a little evidence contra Piketty.

A few weeks ago I was eating lunch at a new, moderately priced restaurant in downtown OKC, Park House. While enjoying a conversation with my lunch companions, I noticed that a familiar face was being seated at a nearby table. The man did not standout in any particular way from the other patrons, but I recognized him as Harold Hamm.  While only one table separated our dinning experience, about $12.4 billion separates our net worth.

Around us was a broad cross section of folks some in suits and ties, some in shorts and flip flops. Undoubtedly, Mr. Hamm has a lot of opportunities I and the other customers don't have. He could have ordered everything on the menu without breaking a sweat and the charge would be a rounding error in his life. A second entree would have a very expensive luxury for me that day. Regardless, the fact remains he couldn't have eaten or enjoyed the meal more than me in any practical sense. Heck, I was even seated at a slightly better table.

We are not economic equals, but you wouldn't have known it from observing us at lunch that day. There are roughly two types of realistic egalitarian societies: those that are so poor that no one is able to become unequally wealthy and those that are so rich that fortunately only few are not able to live alongside the technically wealthy.

Adding Value to Investment Management

I've clumsily touched on this before.

I believe active investment management (e.g., being a stock picker who is aiming to outperform the market) is actually just a proxy for risk exposure--dialing up or down one's exposure to market risk. Consider the market price discovery process as a game whereby success is rewarded, poor performance is punished, and market knowledge increases even if average participant knowledge and skill does not.

For example, consider people betting on football games. The bets placed are on which team will win and by how many points in a given matchup. As people make their guesses over the course of many games and over time, the good guessers are rewarded with more resources while the bad guessers are punished encouraging or forcing them to exit the market. The average guess is the market price, the best estimate of future results. The market's knowledge increases along two dimensions: as more people make guesses, more information is incorporated into the price; additionally, as results come in, the better guessers dominate the guessing. This is a simple illustration of the wisdom of crowds. Yet as a new participant starts making guesses, there is no way to know what his guesses will look like or if they will be more accurate than the average guess. Paradoxically, these new guesses will very likely be less accurate than the market's estimates but their addition to the market will add to the market's accuracy. How does this paradox hold?

Imagine the market estimate is for OU to beat Texas by 10 points. A new bettor comes into the market betting that OU will beat Texas by 17 points. Let's assume that subsequently the market estimate adjusts to OU will beat Texas by 11 points. OU then does beat Texas by 12 points. The market was more accurate than the new guesser, but the new guesser improved the market's accuracy. I contend the specifics of this example are a good representation of new information incorporated into the market. It didn't have to be that the new guesser was less accurate and still accretive to the market estimate. To be clear that is my argument.

Thus, the market price is a random walk (we can't predict the direction or magnitude of the next change in price) with a drift--a drift towards greater accuracy. Active managers are attempting to be smarter than the market. However, the market is pretty darn smart, like +99% smart--meaning that is how close the market generally gets to accuracy (being as accurate as one could be at a given point in time). How confident are we these managers can add to that and why would we think they could, over time, across hundreds of securities at any one point in time? Even if there is a persistent flow of "dumb money" flowing in to the system, why should these managers be in any position to consistently pluck it off? It is very doubtful they would be, and if they were, why is the dumb money so willing to put itself in such a position? We can tell stories here to hypothesize about why, but inherently there is a tension between those stories and the underlying market process that makes those stories necessary--if the market is getting smarter, then the new money must be getting dumber to allow for smart money to be smart (i.e., smarter than the market). But then how can the market be getting smarter???

Active management is risky arbitrage at best. Here is what I mean: imagine I see that the price of rice in Japan is $550 per ton while the price in the U.S. is only $450 per ton and total shipping costs average about $50 per ton. A riskless arbitrage would be if I could instantly buy rice in the U.S. market and sell rice in the Japanese market at the prevailing prices less the shipping cost. Let's say I explore that option but find it is not available. The next best thing is to physically buy rice in the U.S., rent a ship, steam over to Japan, sell the rice . . . then . . . profit. Turns out when I get there they won't let me sell it. Or they will let me sell it but only with a hefty $100 per ton tariff charge. Oh, and the ship might sink before I get there. What I have engaged in is a risky arbitrage. My ignorance of Japanese tariffs or my bad fortune on the high seas means my attempts to beat the market on pricing rice were in vain.

I was operating somewhat in the dark in my rice arbitrage, and more knowledge would have been helpful. Alas, overwhelmingly most knowledge is hidden. Market participants, even the brilliant ones, can never be certain they even have the sign on the price discrepancy right. To wit from our analogy, the price of rice in Japan might be LOWER than the world price once all opportunity costs including risk are considered.

This puts active management in a new light. It isn't an attempt to deliver above-market returns. It is an attempt to deliver more risky or less risky market performance--it could be either case depending on the manager. Modern portfolio theory simplifies the world and says investors achieve this by borrowing or lending at the risk-free rate and then increasing or decreasing respectively their exposure to THE market portfolio. Perhaps active management is a real-world facilitator to achieve these ends.

Everybody Talks

Listening to a recent Freakonomics Radio episode about gossip got me thinking about journalism and the perhaps unintended role it plays or has played in regulating society some. In the episode we first hear about research by Thomas Corley summarized in his book "Rich Habits" that showed the behavior differences between rich people and poor people. One of the differences he found was that the rich gossip significantly less than the poor. However, the rest of the episode tends to dispute that finding.

What stood out to me was how necessary the role of gossip seems to be for many aspects of society (e.g., norm setting and regulation) and how differently we approach and are affected by gossip. It doesn't seem at all unlikely to me that the wealthy would have different gossip habits and methods than the poor. The rich have different tools--namely, they have journalism. Or at least they had it until those crazy kids started TweetBooking everything.

Here is a theory that probably isn't original to me. I am not completely sold on it myself; it's just a hunch that I think at least partially explains what we've seen.

The rich and powerful have traditionally exerted a lot of control and influence over news media. This part is not in dispute. The creation and growth of news media served two primary purposes: 1) it had an informative value (stock reports, political actions, etc.) and 2) it had an entertainment value (local celebrity news, sports, etc.). But the problem is aside from the cut and dried factual reporting like the price of wheat or the winner of the mayor's race, most news reports have some damaging aspect to them that someone would like to keep quiet. These could range political corruption to a juicy, high-profile divorce to, well, the price of wheat for the guy who is trying to buy at a market discount. When we get down to it, the fact that we have journalism and that the rich and powerful put up with it seems a bit of a puzzle.

So what explains journalism as we know it--journalism that reports the good, the bad, and the ugly for the most part about both the rich and the poor? I think game theory offers a solution. The idea is that journalism is a necessary evil. Basically the job description was artificially created because the role was needed more than it was wanted. This puts it at odds with the idea that journalists are noble superheroes with special investigative and truth-finding powers striving to do good--journalists aren't that special, just don't tell them that. Rather it is as if the rich sat down and played a quick game of MAD where they realized they needed a controlled outlet to realize the informative value and entertainment value of journalism but not have chaotic reporting where the message cannot be controlled. What's more journalism offers what I would call auditor-caused moral hazard--if the auditor doesn't catch it or correct it, then it must be okay. That is a useful if unintentional purpose.

Of course there was not some secret meeting on Jekyll Island where journalism was launched, and the early twentieth century's muckraking shows how different the market for journalism can play out than what the rich and powerful might otherwise like. However, it was some of the rich and powerful on the production side of muckraking. So, no; journalism was not centrally planned or created in the last 200 years. It is a very long-run emergent order. Yet being emergent does not preclude it from my game theory theory or isolate it from powerful guiding influences. I think that my theory well explains how it was nurtured and shaped. Or perhaps captured is the better term. When journalism emerges as powerful enough to threaten the elite, the elite appropriate it for themselves.

With some ebb and flow between a more pure journalism and a more controlled journalism, this all is going along nicely until the Internet comes along. Then chaos. The Internet causes major disruptions to this order by commoditizing the tools of journalism with blogging, smartphones, et al. flattening the business model. The elite did not have this in mind. If the journalists are "us", and all of us at that, then we, elites and all, have to be more honest. We can't control the message or information--at least that control is very greatly weakened. Journalism before served a purpose to tell a story, a version of the truth, to the masses as a few saw fit. Now journalism is telling many stories, many versions of the truth including many with higher truth value than before, to varying numbers of consumers as many see fit. And it is deeper than that. The story isn't so one directional. It is more and more a conversation.

The quickest way to wreck a game theory optimal solution is to change a premise. The Internet is just such a change to the game theoretic outcome that journalism had been for so long.

The rent is too damn high!

One of the growing pains associated with getting wealthier is that things change in value and thereby the dynamics of tradeoffs change in turn. Here is a great example of this phenomenon. As I heard this story driving into work the other morning, I was struck by how poor the reasoning was for those who are "fighting back".

The essentials in this story are indicative of something happening in many places. San Francisco is a very desirable place to be. It is not just my opinion that it is awesome. As evidenced by the story, it is many people’s opinion and those opinions are strong (as measured by the willingness to put lots of their money behind that opinion). As the San Francisco desirability has grown, the value of real estate there has grown too. Ah, but there is the rub. Not everyone benefits from that increase in value. Now that new additional people and their wallets have arrived, the current residents who were enjoying it for less cost than what it is worth today are screaming, "There goes the neighborhood!"

It has always been the case that a rising value of real estate meant that the use of that real estate would change over time, but for some reason it has become a popular media topic. There are a few of ironies in these stories that don't get adequately reported if they are mentioned at all:

1. A large part of why the cost of living rises quite rapidly as popularity rises in many highly desirable places like San Francisco is because of legal impediments to growth and development. The same government that creates the zoning laws et al. that limit development is the government those "fighting back" would like to see prevent the cost from rising.
2. Dovetailing with that is the irony that rent-controlled living, artificially shielding renters from the full cost of living, discourages real estate development that would then be subject to rent control. A viscous cycle emerges of artificial scarcity begetting higher costs and hence higher value for the cost shielded (rent-controlled) space.
3. As evidenced by some of the comments in the written piece, there seems to be a huge intolerance for change (and those bringing the change) by those who espouse tolerance as a virtue of the current neighborhood.

But here is what really struck me—the poor reasoning of those "fighting back". I put fighting back into quotes because the use of it in the reporting is pejorative towards those being fought against. Those "fighting back" (the renters) actually are attacking those who were already being disadvantaged through rent control. My points are the following:

1. It sucks to see things around you change in ways that you don't desire. Part of that in this story is the composition of the neighborhood. But I think that is a sideline issue and a distraction. The renters would not be bringing it up if it did not put a more high-brow spin on the real fight—namely, the desire to continue to get something for less than the full cost at someone else’s expense. Nevertheless, let’s take seriously the consideration that change isn't always beneficial to all involved. But that is a fact of life. Don't be mad at those changing the neighborhood. Be glad to live in a place that largely allows change.
2. No one said you deserve to live in the same place for the same cost for as long as you like. That is a promise no one can reasonably keep. Don't be mad that the real estate owners have found a "loophole" to evict the rent-controlled tenants. Be glad to have benefitted at the owner’s expense up until now.
3. You are the RENTER. You chose to RENT the place you lived in, which meant you weren't responsible for all the risks and expense associated with being an OWNER. Now that the OWNER, the one who is entitled to the property, has seen a return potential for the risk he bore, he has the natural right to realize that return. Don't be mad that the OWNER has new options. Be glad you didn't have to bear costs and risks you chose to avoid.

Yes, this change isn't working out very well for those who were benefiting from rent control. And I do indeed sympathize with the difficulties and emotional stress and loss that all come from having to move. But think about it this way. Suppose San Francisco had instead grown to be very undesirable. Suppose rental rates had plummeted. Suppose that come renewal time those in rent-controlled apartments either had cheaper rent options in different apartments or simply wanted to leave San Francisco altogether. Would it be in any way right to force the renters to renew the now more expensive rent-controlled lease and to force those who wanted to leave to stay in San Francisco?

Highly linkable

The more I read about pirates the less I think the Jack Sparrow saga is based on true events. (HT: Tyler Cowen)

What do you mean the cost of health care is going up?!?

But surely there aren't simple, compromise solutions that while they may not be first best, are second best and far and away better than the Obamamess?

Finally, here is a great summary of what market "efficiency" is really all about. One of many money quotes:

Efficiency implies that professional managers should do no better than monkeys with darts. This prediction too bears out in the data. It too could have come out the other way. It should have come out the other way! In any other field of human endeavor, seasoned professionals systematically outperform amateurs.

We need more teacher pay inequality

A recent conversation with a relative who I am quite sure is a very good teacher got me thinking about the conventional wisdom regarding teacher pay--specifically, that teachers are underpaid.

While I feel strongly about this particular teacher's abilities, I do not feel as strongly that she is "underpaid" despite being in a position of relative low pay when considering hours and effort that go into her job. Likewise, I don't think she herself necessarily believes she is "underpaid", though that would be a common and understandable instinctive feeling. If I have to guess, I would say she is indeed underpaid, but as you will see that is not a guess I can arrive at lightly nor can I have much confidence in it.

Here are my thoughts:

A status of being low paid is only meaningful in a relative sense. However, a status of underpaid is also a relative status, but the two are not congruent. Underpaid is a deeper sense of relative--kind of a second derivative in a manner of thinking. To be low paid simply means having a lower absolute level of income in some comparison. To make that comparison more meaningful one should seek a good apples-to-apples arrangement. Obviously comparing a $40,000 a year job to a 10,000 Euro per month job doesn't tell us much. We get more information in comparing a $20 per statutory hour job with a $30 per statutory hour job, but we don't get a whole lot more. Most professionals including many teachers put in time beyond the standard work day.

Suppose we could get a standardized denominator of effort hours (we can't just use hours because an hour spent scanning people in at the local gym is not the same as an hour spent fighting a fire). How meaningful would that comparison of pay then be? The answer is "a lot more meaningful but still significantly short of deep economic significance". Certainly that information would help guide a lot of career decisions, but it still doesn't tell us if someone is underpaid. To get that comparison, we need to know if a particular person should make more. The person should make more (technically speaking, command a greater share of society's resources) if the value of her teaching (resource she creates) is worth more than the total pay she receives (resources she uses). Our best bet to know this answer (and this is a loose use of the term know since we actually can only hope to have a really good guess) is through a market process--and you thought I was going to say government omniscience.

Notice that the market answer is usually the standard to judge the righteousness of outcomes not because we define optimal resource allocation as the outcome the market creates but because we believe (with really good reason) that under the right conditions the market will elicit optimal resource allocations. Those right conditions are when markets are deep, cheap, and esteemed (lots of knowledgeable buyers and sellers with low transactions costs where property rights are firm, clear, and respected). We need a substantial degree of all of these to describe a market as a free market. The free market is not God. The free market is our way of discovering how a benevolent, omniscient dictator (a god-like super creature) would allocate resources.

But the education market is not conducted under very favorable conditions to elicit good allocations. Transactions costs are high and knowledge is expensive. Government separates buyer and seller insulating sellers from the discipline the market would otherwise provide*. We can probably expect a few outcomes from this as it relates to teacher pay. Pay differentials will become compressed where bad teachers are overpaid and good teachers are underpaid. Resource allocation communication and decisions will be further polluted pushing good teachers out of the profession or encouraging them to shirk while inducing bad teachers to enter the profession.

Because of this, I am led to believe that my relative is indeed likely underpaid (I have a lot of inside information about how good a teacher she is). However, (and now isn't this ironic?) for the same reason I believe she is underpaid, I cannot have much confidence in this judgment. That is at the heart of the problem with heavily government-influenced markets--they obfuscate knowledge inhibiting the communication process the market wants to provide.


*Nature abhors a vacuum and the market abhors bad resource allocation. In this sense the market naturally works toward being a free market. It is because of this positive feedback loop, a virtuous cycle, that markets are so powerfully good.

Did we really expect Big Bird to be good at running the world's largest health insurer?

In 2009 in the midst of an economic and financial crisis, the President of the United States chose to direct his administration's efforts toward solving the problems of health insurance as he saw them. For some reason he believed massively increasing third-party payment (a condition that we have no evidence and no theory to suggest should work) was the key solution along with price controls, production quotas, and government-provided alternatives. There were lots of reasons to believe this would not work out well, but the generally overlooked one was the world's largest mega-conglomerate has a horrible track record of getting from intentions to effective and efficient execution.

The virtues of Obama's intentions were well disputed. Arguments were also strongly and sufficiently offered against the effect these policy changes would bring about. But few, Megan McArdle the exception, predicted the websites wouldn't work. Yet we shouldn't be surprised. All reasonable philosophies of political economy leave room for the failure of democratic governance. Coming from a libertarian, free-market philosophy, I believe these schemes are destined to fail because government lacks the proper incentives. But others coming from a progressive philosophy should expect that sinister Republicans, conservatives, tea-partiers, et al. will thwart the efforts of the enlightened. It only becomes utopian nonsense when after the supposed thwarting the defense of failure is "It would have worked if it weren't for you meddling kids."

The website failure is a demonstrative microcosm for why Obamacare is doomed. These aren't glitches, this is a canary in the coal mine.

A challenge to Landsburg

Steven Landsburg is an economist I greatly admire. The depth and uniqueness of his mind and viewpoint are quite amazing. So it is with trepidation that I challenge an argument he has made several times before and has touched on in another guise yet again. I expect it is likely that I am not refuting Landsburg. More likely I am misunderstanding the argument and hence not addressing it or I'm making a weak argument--a weakness I cannot see.

The main argument is about wasteful competition. The first appearance I can recall is here. Followed by another here. Then came this very interesting question about taxing novelists for the same reason we may want to tax carbon. He followed the post with another for clarification.

There are multiple arguments being made in these posts, and I agree substantially with many. Where I disagree is in this concept of wasteful competition--that the additional athlete, football team, novelist, etc. is more socially costly than beneficial. If I have it correctly, the argument runs as follows:

1. The resources devoted to a marginal addition in output for good X can be substantial.
2. In many cases the output of good X before the marginal increase was already substantial.
3. The gain from the marginal addition of good X is slight.
4. Therefore, we have wasted resources on the margin since the gain does not justify the cost. There is a market failure.

I think there is more going on here. On the surface he appears to lack an appreciation for quality. It is as if at the extreme (perhaps an unfair reductio ad absurdum) he believes mediocrity is the optimum. Yes, that is an unfair characterization, but it is getting toward my point. Looking deeply I do not think we can be so linear in how we think about marginal improvement. It is multidimensional and part of a larger purpose.

The resources that flow into a given endeavor only look out of proportion to the marginal output when we narrowly define the output. The nth cereal on the aisle may not add much to the quality of my breakfast, but it may be a natural and unavoidable byproduct of the magnificent process that brings me cheap cereals (and so much more) on demand and basically without fail.

Consider also that although cost curves decline as quantity produced increases while economies of scale persist, only usually does quantity produced mirror the progression of time. It doesn't have to be the case that quantity and time are interchangeable as the X-axis. So while it may seem wasteful in isolation to see yet another novel published, that may be part of the cost of the first novel.

Finally, innovation often comes in unexpected surges emerging from dull periods of slight and arguably inefficient activity. The iPod was not just one more MP3 player. ESPN was not just one more way to see the already-watched sports.

As for competition and the fear it may become wasteful, be scared. You can't help that. But don't be afraid. We have to strive on for better and higher possibilities.

PS. Here is how I answered the novelist taxation question.

Boardwalk Stillwater

This is really a story about prohibition. And prohibition is at its heart a story about economics.

When you make something illegal that is demanded, you get a black market. In this case the thing demanded is successful college football. The prohibitions are on free-market transactions that connect those providing value, college football players, and those who are consuming the value provided, college football fans. When value cannot fully be reflected between suppliers and demanders, externalities exist—in this case positive externalities meaning the market is undersupplying college football along some dimensions*. The market abhors externalities and is only prevented from erasing them by transactions costs that outweigh the benefits. Transactions costs cast shadows upon markets. When those transactions costs are high enough, the communication process revealing gains from trade can break down significantly. Hence, black-market transactions take the place of open-market transactions.

Black markets have two significant downsides: they aren’t as efficient as open, free markets and they come with baggage (technically speaking, negative unintended consequences). Notably in the second case, black markets incentivize suppliers who aren’t as sensitive to the transactions costs as the typical supplier. Additionally, black-market transactions take on forms that are both less efficient in an economic sense and less sensitive to the standards the original prohibitions attempted to uphold. To wit: Gangsters are successful because they are more willing and able to break the rules and the rules attempt to prevent what otherwise would come to be.

The local response has been predictable in nature and course but surprising in intensity. The clan has been attacked, and all members are called to unquestioned defense. I believe most of the response track has followed something similar to the stages of grieving, and I predict it will continue in such a fashion.

First has come Denial. This couldn’t be true because I don’t want it to be can be read between the lines of many responses. Some examples have been along the lines of: “The players making the accusations are disgruntled former troublemakers,” “There are no documents revealed proving these payments happened,” “One of the authors is an OU alum who dislikes OSU.”

Next will come Rationalization. I expect the group response to be along the lines of: “This happens everywhere, why single us out?” “Most of this isn’t that bad in the grand scheme of things,” “These events are taken out of context; it isn’t that bad.”

Next will come Acceptance along with Anger (I said similar to the stages of grieving, not mirroring it). Expect both some contrivance and sorrow along with a few scapegoats offered up. Eventually, though, someone significant must be to blame, and that person or group of persons will have to pay. Remember, I’m not saying what the NCAA or general public response will be. I am predicting the response from inside the community affected.

As for the response from general public opinion, the Oklahoma State brand has been badly tarnished. The labels these accusations will bring will not easily or quickly be erased. Assuming the accusations are completely true, which I do not, but I do believe they are largely and substantively true, I have already found and expect further to find interesting inconsistencies. There is what sounds bad given our mores: marijuana use along with other drugs, sexual arrangements, payment of college athletes for work performed (playing football well) and work not performed (housework, construction, etc.), and academic leniency and fraud. And then there is what does not sound so bad again given our mores including what is absent in the accusations: alcohol use, athlete exploitation, and unrealistic academic expectations. It is like our social norms on toleration and prohibition were determined by coin flip.

Take us home, Radiohead.

*There is nuance here. The aggregate supply of college football may be sufficient or excessive due to subsidies but at the same time there are specific shortages. For example, it could be that resources aren’t reaching their optimal use by being underemployed—football quality is too low at Oklahoma State and is too high elsewhere.

The value of authenticity

Business Insider has an article about a new technology, 3D printing that replicates paintings, and the implications are interesting. The article focuses a lot on worries that the technology will threaten the art market. These concerns are misplaced for at least three reasons.

First and foremost, the ability to more easily satisfy demand for fine art including "priceless" masterpieces is a feature not a bug. Certainly those who have invested in art will be worse off in direct proportion to the magnitude that this new technology offers a good substitute. But that is simply a transfer from those who own the art to those who would like to own the art. We would have that same effect if we simply took the art from the current owner and gave it to someone who wanted it. But where that property-rights violating transfer probably is utility reducing since the one who loses the art probably valued it more than the one who received the art, this technology is utility enhancing since it creates value on net. The owner still has the art. Someone who values it for less than the current owner wished to relinquish it prior to the technology's advent now has greater access to it--the price of purchasing the art is lower and hence may now be in reach. And others can enjoy the art by replication in a way not previously possible.

We would see the same effect if we stumbled upon a second Mona Lisa truly painted by Leonardo da Vinci. The Louvre might be upset, but the world would gain a second painting of artistic value. The loss in value to the first would be more than displaced by the gain of now having a second.

Second, the value of art is inherently the value of the creation, not simply the monetized utility of those who yield satisfaction from owning, viewing, possessing, etc. the art. Great art has value even if no one is around to appreciate it. The most popular band is not necessarily the band with the best musical artistry. The best food is not made and could not be made for mass consumption. There really is something to expert opinion on matters artistic rather than appeal to popularity--the so called ad populum fallacy. Unfortunately for those in the business of art and art investment, this technology serves to decouple somewhat the artistic appreciation from the financial appreciation.

Third, having more art more widespread enhances us culturally. The promise of this technology advances the football considerably. Greater availability and exposure means more minds can appreciate, admire, and aspire. The economies of scale are the initial effect. The substantial secondary effect is to deepen the market for art. Music is more widespread today than ever by orders of magnitude. At the same time music appreciation, depth, quality, and variety are greater than ever and growing at a compounding rate.

The lesson here is that sharing and duplication continues to be the future. Only the selfish suffer.

It is also interesting how this technology will serve to clarify the value of authenticity. We will now be better able to see how much the average patron really likes a particular painting versus how much the average patron really likes authenticity. We might also learn a lot about how popular certain artists and works are removed from the rarity via authenticity of the work itself--for example, how many people will be hanging Picassos in the living room? And if no one really likes to look at a particular work, does that imply a change in value? I've thought for some time that a future with machines building mastercrafted furniture, art, clothing, etc. will create a world where the truly old and authentic takes on heightened meaning. But a counter force to this is not just how much easier and cheaper it is to preserve antiques (both yesterday's and tomorrow's). It is more strongly how uninteresting authentic may become when everything old is new again.

Highly linkable

Google, the great disruptor, is at it again this time targeting TV.

All those beauty queens may finally get their wish.

This one from Megan McArdle is heavyweight great. Far too often the simplistic analysis of policy advocates fails miserably to fully appreciate the nuances and complexities of life and its tradeoffs.

Angus points to a paper showing that 401(k) plans can have hidden and unavoidable pitfalls.

More sharing is made possible through technology. This time it involves ad hoc tasks. The future isn't plastics as much as it is butlers and maids for the masses. (HT: Mark Perry at Carpe Diem)

Far be it from me to advocate more regulation, but the NCAA is a government sanctioned and subsidized monster that may need some babysitting. Here is a nice start.

John Cochrane raises some quibbles but largely agrees with Greg Mankiw's take on Au.

Steven Landsburg shows us one awesome version of the Game of Life. (Warning: the nerd indications are high on this one.)

Here at MM we love sports ticket intermediators (pejoratively also known as "scalpers"). Here is a great video arguing our point.

Flooding the sports autograph memorabilia market

This past weekend was Meet the Sooners Day for the Oklahoma Sooners football team as the kicked off the start of fall practice. I would assume that this fairly common event throughout college football shares the same rules, which attempt to keep it child-focused. Those rules specify:

Each child may be accompanied by a maximum of one adult, but adults will not be permitted to submit items for autographs.

Each child may bring ONE item to be signed - no exceptions.

These rules are designed to keep Ernie eBay from having all the start players and coaches sign 15 items all to be auctioned off to the highest bidder. This leads me to some thoughts:

1. Is the university or athletic department opposed to sports memorabilia? More specifically, opposed to a secondary market in sports memorabilia? Do they find it unhealthy, unwholesome, and this is a way to somewhat defund it? If so and setting aside the silly moralistic position, I think they are going about it the wrong way. I'll elaborate shortly but in another point because I find it unlikely this is the primary cause.
2. I do think there is some highbrowishness supporting the motives, but I generally think it is a genuine and legitimate attempt to be mindful of the players' scarce time (minimally exploitative for a change) and direct the benefits to the most deserving group (children).
3. Are the universities, athletic departments, and the NCAA missing a revenue opportunity while at the same time missing the best method to limit or control the secondary market? I think the answer here is a resounding yes. I think with two actions Meet the Sooners Day would be all about the kids without the rules needed to make it so. 
• Organize a signing by the entire roster on a limited number of sports items to be sold through the athletic department. Johnny Manziel purportedly was paid $7,500 to sign 300 mini and regular-sized helmets. These would be "authentic, originally-signed" autographed items. 
• At the same time take an electronic image of each player's signature. Use this to mass produce signed items. This essentially floods the market for signed goods taking away most of the impetus for others to duplicate these efforts.
4. Of course these business actions might be a bridge too far making it obvious that a third action would be necessary to avoid charges of exploitation--give the players the proceeds of these sales.

Update: seems the NCAA was already taking a bridge too far, http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/dennis-dodd/23070728/ncaa-to-exit-business-of-selling-schoolrelated-online-items