When a Deal is Not a Deal

Ben Thompson writes:

Swift is doing the exact same thing, which is why the story of her breakup with Big Machine and the question of who was right or wrong ultimately doesn’t matter; Swift, like Chappelle, is taking her masters, whether she owns them or not.

That’s the part that Logan forgot: when it comes to a world of abundance the power that matters is demand, and demand is driven by fans of Swift, not lawyers for Big Machine or Scooter Braun or anyone else.

That is part of a very good analysis of how content creators are ultimately king. The story rankles me some from the standpoint of the ethics of going back on a deal even if the deal was not made under purely power symmetrical terms.

He relates it to NFTs. The persuasive claim he makes is that NFTs derive value from the collective agreement, Arnold Kling would say consensual hallucination, that there is value.

Near the end Thompson concludes:

If the creator decides that their NFTs are important, they will have value; if they decide their show is worthless, it will not. And, in the case of Swift, if she decides that albums are valuable they will be, not because they are now scarce, but because only she can declare an album “Taylor’s Version”.

Annuities - A Troubled Solution in Search of a Problem

Years ago I'm sitting in a San Francisco coffee shop with my wife enjoying breakfast. Without trying to or really wanting to we can easily hear the conversation from a close-by table. It was two young couples. Both were well dressed, but one was decidedly more outgoing and charismatic. One might even describe them as smooth.

They were clearly on travelling together. Somehow their conversation turned to topics that drew my attention. It began innocently enough.

"Well, what are your plans?" or so went the inquiry. "Nobody wants to think about this stuff, but it is important." They were clearly talking about someone who wasn't there. 

"It is hard to know what to do."

"Look, we obviously can't know the future. But with this approach at least you have something to show for it..." Turning to her partner a little too on cue, "Remember Grandma’s experience..."

I don't remember too vividly the exact conversation--I honestly wasn't trying to listen.* It was not a simple case of a couple-friend giving friendly advice. This was a sales pitch. And they were selling the other couple on the idea of long-term care insurance, a type of annuity that has very strict terms regarding when it will be paid along with sharp limits on how much and long payment will occur. 

LTC insurance plans are not bad per se. They can work in practice; though they more frequently work in theory. While I didn't know all the relevant facts in this situation, and it was none of my business regardless, the conversation frustrated me. In fact I was offended. Why?

I was offended because they were using emotion to solve a math problem. Well, more precisely they were disguising an emotional pitch as if it were a math problem, pretending it was a math problem, and not doing or even hinting at any math! 

Presumably there would be some assumption-laden work-up presented at some point before signing on the dotted line. Let's charitably assume there was--that all we were witness to was the initial hook. Regardless, I resented both the approach and the fact that it appeared to be working.

It was a learning moment for me. As analytical as I want things to be, the truth is humans are emotion-driven beings. Many of our decisions are based on feelings. We seek social desirability and find comfort in confirmation. 

This is why confident people are charming. Especially it is so when they are selling us something. 

How you say it versus what you say--delivery versus content. They will remember how confident they were in you long after they have forgotten what you actually said. 

I remembered this story as I read this recent piece from Vanguard, Guaranteed Income: A Tricky Trade-Off. From the summary bullet points:

The math is clear. A certain income can leave retirees better prepared for an uncertain lifetime. But retirees’ reluctance to annuitize suggests that the irrevocable decision to exchange liquid wealth for guaranteed income is about more than math.**

It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that there are two types of people in the financial products industry: those who sell annuities and those who detest them. A derogatory but perhaps not unfair way of describing annuities is to say that they are never bought always sold. Another is that the primary beneficiary on a variable annuity is the sales person.

Annuities work extremely well in theory. They are straightforward instruments that spread risk and smooth income. 

In practice they are extremely complicated, notoriously misleading, and very expensive. There are exceptions. The regulations around them have improved the situation some, but I would argue strongly that this is a second-best solution behind simply allowing more competition in the industry in the first place. World-class fine dining in Napa Valley isn't because of world-class restaurant regulation. 

If you're paying attention, you'll have noticed a paradox. I started by showing that people often use emotion to sell a financial solution but then argued that emotion is keeping people from adopting those same financial solutions. But that really isn't a mystery. If people are reluctant to listen to the clear math supporting annuitizing future income, it stands to reason that emotion will be perhaps necessary to get them over the hump. 

*In fact they were so bad at attempting to be discrete that I can only assume we too were part of the sales audience.

**The Vanguard piece points to fear of regret and a strong bequest motive as the major obstacles to annuity adoption. I liked their analysis, but I don't think they sufficiently considered just how few good, honest annuity options there are. Hard to buy what isn't being sold--especially with fair options that do leave bequests. And it is harder and harder to sell them. Whether deserved or not (it is definitely deserved!), annuities have been given a bad name by all the many investment advisors who rail against them. 

Briefly Evaluating Biden’s First 100 Days

The short, short version is Gerald Ford doing a bad Jimmy Carter impersonation--with apologies to the very underrated Jimmy Carter.

I look forward to the point when the gesture politics will take a back seat to actual governing, and I hope they get religion on spending before reality forces a come to Jesus moment.

Let's do it by focusing on The Big Six.

• Drug Prohibition - Perhaps this summarizes where we are. I am shocked, SHOCKED!. We elected an OG drug prohibitionist and a bully cop, and we’re surprised that instead of legalization we got more of the same. (0/1)
• War - The administration seems to be content to continue Trump's policies on China, but the promised withdrawal from Afghanistan is potentially a significant improvement.  (0.5/2)
• Taxes - The plan so far is not too surprising, but it is still undesirable. The corporate tax increase is much much bigger once you account for the fact that Trumps reductions we’re paid for with reductions in loopholes. Going back to the prior rates without the loopholes is a big net increase on AN ENTITY THAT DOESN'T PAY TAXES! People pay taxes. When you tax corporations, the tax incidence falls on owners, employees, and customers. (0.5/3)
• Education - Biden specifically and the administration and Democratic Party generally cannot part ways from the teacher’s unions. Clearly the direction is for the government to vastly increase its role. They lost me at "12 years of [compulsory] schooling is not enough". (0.5/4)
• Immigration - Finally something we should be able to give a clear win on, but . . . it is hard to see these as anything more than better promises but very short actual results. Still, let's grade on a curve and hope for the best. (1.5/5)
• Housing Development - It appears there is hope that the Biden administration will lean toward YIMBY policies. As Republicans and many conservatives retrench deeply into antidevelopment rhetoric, the progressives may stumble into enlightenment simply by trying to be the opposite. (2.5/6)

Trade policy would be another important and interesting area given the place this issue held over the past administration. Sadly Biden hasn't changed in all these decades. He is still economically ignorant or simply a captured interest. And he looks like Trump 2.0 on China trade specifically.

Sigh***

Finding Common Ground

Lasting intellectual, legal, and cultural progress comes by working with ideological opponents rather than despite them. As good as it might make one feel to 'Yeah!' our team and 'Boo!' their team, those tribal behaviors set us back. 

That is why I am excited for the recent collaboration between strange bedfellows Ben Cohen & Jerry Greenfield and the Cato Institute scholars is Clark Neily & Jay Schweikert who are all working to end qualified immunity. 

See also Ben Cohen's book, Above the Law.

Zoning Laws Suffer From The Fixed Window Fallacy

The Fixed Window Fallacy is an error in reasoning whereby people believe they know or can know what is nice/preferred/optimal. This line of thought is based on unimaginative, linear-thinking and further held back by the Local Maximum Problem. 

It can be summarized as a thought process that goes: "We know what is best. We/they can afford what is desired (after all, it is usually for our/their own good). Therefore, we should make ourselves/them provide it." 

Both premises are false, and the conclusion is fallacious (non sequitur) as it ignores the critical questions: do we have a right to do this, and can we successfully do this? 
The only constant is change, and it comes in two types. 

1. Depreciation, which is the natural condition, difficult to counter, and mostly objective.
2. Appreciation, which is the abnormal condition, difficult to achieve, and highly subjective. 

Attempts to stop depreciation such as zoning laws are never done in a vacuum. They are not single events where good replaces bad, and we move on to the next decision. They are part of economic evolution where decisions made affect trend trajectories with uncertain net outcomes and unpredictable magnitudes. 

Similarly collective action attempts to realize appreciation such as subsidizes for development and master plans are fraught with captured interest risk bringing asymmetric outcomes adverse to the presumed collective goal. In other words the rent-seeking developers and their friends in power do what is good for them and costly for society. For those cases where everyone has the best of intentions, we still have the knowledge problem. When artificial outcomes are engineered by those who do not bear the full risk, bad ideas do not get properly punished and good ideas do not get properly rewarded. 

Back to zoning, trying to stop people from doing things they want to do is prohibition. People and markets work to thwart prohibitions in proportion to how much they desire that which is prohibited. The less morally sound the prohibition, the less compliant are those working against it and those third parties who have no dog in the fight. Fortunately the long-term trend is for less and less prohibition. Unfortunately working against a prohibition is costly as is the administration of a prohibition. 

Whether it is in icky markets (e.g., sex work, recreational drugs deemed illicit, kidney transplants, etc.) or in we-know-better markets (e.g., zoning), an underlying force supporting the prohibition is not in my backyard thinking. In fact I believe NIMBY is the last vestige of prohibition rationalization.

An Addition to My The Big Five

I hate having to do this, but I feel it is necessary to add to my list of the low-hanging fruit of public policy where 90% solutions (improvements) on these issues are several orders of magnitude more important than 99% solutions on a thousand others. In my defense this was always filed under "partial list", and it continues to be. I just hate making a tag and then needing to update it. 

Keep in mind that I did issue addendums to the list shortly after first publication. This will take one of those and elevate it to the new big list.

The Big Six:

• Drug Prohibition (end it--allow adults to make their own choices)
• Education (privatize it--give the government an ever-smaller role)
• Immigration (open it up--allow people to freely move and freely interact with other people)
• Taxation (simplify and redirect it--efficiently tax the use of resources not the creation of resources)
• War (move away from it--make postures less bellicose and violence less of an option).
• ***AND*** Housing Development (greatly reduce the obstacles and restrictions so that the owners of capital can buy, build, and reconfigure real estate as they see fit)

First because of Kevin Erdmann's work and recently because of Bryan Caplan's current discussion and forthcoming work, I have become radicalized to make this addition to my reform agenda canon. 

Living in a historic district with all its well-intended nonsense, I see this issue close at hand. The HD seems to be a classic case of people being nostalgic for a past that didn’t actually exist. The effect is expense for homeowners, self-righteous satisfaction for busybodies, a jobs program for the rent-seeking suppliers and regulators, and general exclusion for those who don’t fit in or can’t afford to. 

Every day I see stark examples of the perfect being the enemy of the good. 

The Local Maximum Problem

Ever since being introduced to this concept, I’ve been intrigued by it and see examples of it more and more throughout life, business, and public policy. This is the problem that occurs when people get stuck in a situation that is the best near-term or near-possible outcome but is not the best possible yet reasonable long-term outcome. 

The analogy is to imagine four people playing a game that has them blindfolded and linked arm-in-arm in a square configuration. Each member of this team is responsible for one of the cardinal directions (north, south, east, and west). Their goal is to locate the highest point possible. They experiment by taking steps to see if a step in that direction is up or down. If the step is down, they don’t take it. If the step is up, they take it. They keep walking until none of the four can make a step that is in the upward direction. This point is the conclusion of their game by reaching the local maximum. However it is most likely not the highest point on the surface where they’re walking. They just can’t reach (or detect) a higher point by virtue of their own rules. 

I believe governments are particularly susceptible to this problem. The rewards for experimentation that drive one out of a local maximum are very dispersed or completely irrelevant to those bearing the costs of experimentation. This is more than just people not wanting their cheese moved or having their apple cart disrupted. This is the very legitimate concern that an ambitious idea is going to have significant negative outcomes or the potential rewards will not accrue to those bearing the risk. It is an acute combination of asymmetric risk-reward and principal-agent problems.

The many, many public and private failures in the COVID pandemic are vivid examples. Perhaps the most costly in the United States were the CDC and FDA's insistence on using their own developed testing (staying with the controllable and familiar) and as important if not more so the refusal to allow challenge trials to speed the vaccine development process. Sadly this list goes on and on from "pausing" the Johnson & Johnson vaccine to not approving AstraZeneca's. 

The position those in power have taken are understandable but completely inexcusable. And we have ourselves to blame as these mistakes are just the latest examples of how the FDA works against medical advancement and is a deep net cost to society. 

To be sure individuals, firms, and other organizations are also susceptible to the LMP. Notice, though, the degree to which these entities are somewhat or greatly better structured and incentivized to resist and correct it.  

As a general rule, the more insulated and protected an entity is from competition, the more vulnerable they are to a local maximum. Hence, traditional banks are more vulnerable than are start-up fintech firms. 

To whom a firm or organization is held responsive has strong implications for its fragility to local maximums. As a firm is more responsive to those who reap rewards proportional to risk taken, it will better prevent the LMP. Hence, non-profits (highly responsive to donors rather than customers) are more at risk than are profit-seeking firms (highly responsive to owners and customers). 

Within a firm the dominant force becomes existing and entrenched stakeholders who are in comfortable, conventional positions. Hence, no one in marketing will ever suggest the firm experiment by not running ads. 

The degree to which a person faces public scrutiny or cannot capitalize on public adoration, the more they will rest once finding the local maximum. Hence, a public figure with a lot to lose/little to gain will tend to play it safe. 

Risk bearing requires compensation in the form of return, and this risk-return should be commensurate, symmetrical, and willfully accepted. Those are tough hurdles to achieve. All the more so when we are relying on force rather than persuasion. 

P.S. I believe Arnold Kling deserves credit for introducing me to this concept.