Crime and Punishment, Law and Order, Optimal Rulebreaking

From Advanced NFL Stats:

Last week a WSJ article about the Seahawks' defensive backs claimed that they "obstruct and foul opposing receivers on practically every play."  I took a deeper look in to the numbers and found that as long as referees are reluctant to throw flags on the defense in pass coverage (as claimed in the article), holding the receiver is a very efficient defensive strategy despite the risk of being penalized.

That is from a guest post by Gary Montry, a professional applied mathematician. The article is very interesting, but gets a little deep into the statistics beyond the points I want to discuss here. Nevertheless, it is a rewarding read that I encourage including being as Brian Burke puts it, "a great refresher on conditional probabilities and Bayes' theorem".

The article made me think a little about how economic efficiency many times runs counter to our intuition and ideals when it comes to wrongdoing. Novices often get confused by the fact that the economically optimal level of pollution, crime, et al. is not at all zero. It is not that a certain level of pollution is a pure good or that some amount of crime is desirable in an absolute sense--these are still and always "bads" rather than "goods". It is just that at some point the benefit of eliminating the next (aka, marginal unit of) crime or amount of pollution is not worth the cost. At that point we tolerate the "bad". Fortunately, economic progress implies that the cost curve for fighting problems is ever declining.

Tying this back to the article, the question is how could the rules or enforcement be restructured so that this manipulation, which is arguably against the spirit as well as the letter of the law of the game, is corrected or reduced. Howard Wasserman's new paper on Football and the Infield Fly Rule, which is on my to-read list, may offer some help here. The paper is an exploration of how some football situations may imply and incite behavior that is counter to the spirit of the game and sportsmanship. I don't expect him to address this specific issue, but I do expect the analysis to offer some help in situations such as this.

The article also got me thinking about how my neighborhood's HOA is considering instituting fines for uncorrected violations of the neighborhood's covenants. At issue mainly is roof-mounted satellite dishes that are visible from the street--because we all know that things like this "obviously" lower property values by "a lot" (economic research forthcoming I'm sure). Here are some of my concerns assuming we even have the authority as an HOA to do this and assuming (a BIG assumption) the covenants are optimal as written:

• Will the punishment (fine) fit the crime? How would we know? If the fine is set so that the behavior is undoubtedly discontinued, we've probably set it too high. If the fine is always paid with no change in behavior, it is not necessarily but could be too low. In fact the optimal fine probably has some of the violations corrected and some continued. But the same people who roll their eyes when economists say we want some level of pollution to continue probably roll their eyes in uproar to think that the neighbor gets to just pay a pittance to continue their property-value-destroying activity. Mrs. Kravitz would be shocked!
• Do we set the fine equal for all violations (that is the proposal on the table)? Is parking a trailer or a boat for "long periods" in a driveway equal to satellite dishes being visible and equal to trash cans out of compliance and equal to dead trees not removed or not replaced by the right kind/size of tree etc.? It seems the answer to the second question is most likely "no", which implies the problems of getting the fines right is growing in magnitude.
• Do we really want the reputation as the neighborhood who runs around assessing fines on one another? Is that property value maximizing? The list and litany of compliance violations came out a bit during the recent HOA meeting. The implication seemed to fall on deaf ears.
• Have we given up on neighborly persuasion? Can't we all just get along? 

Rule making and rule enforcing are endeavors fraught with unintended consequences. Just desires and outcomes are almost always highly debatable and are always evolving. Simplier is usually better. Persuasion is generally preferred to force. Tread lightly. 

PS. I knew I was in trouble when the HOA asked if the trees I had planted were "free-range" or "farmed". 

Highly linkable

NFL overtime is broken. Fortunately, Brian Burke is here to fix it.

Be happy because, well, Cause it's getting better; Growing stronger, warm and wilder; Getting better everyday! (be sure not to miss the second link, Fool!).

But I had the best of intentions; I didn't mean for that to happen.

The real reason Henry Ford raised his worker's wages--standard high school history is lies and garbage.

Something to be thankful for.

The Pope has a lot to learn about economics. Reviewing the extensive Library of Economics and Liberty would be a good start. Here is a recent piece by Bob Murphy to get him started.

Saving football from itself

Football is at a major inflection point. These don't come along often. The first one of this nature was at the beginning of the twentieth century when Teddy Roosevelt "saved" football by urging rule changes. In 1905 there were reportedly 19 fatalities from playing football. Following that season an intercollegiate conference, forerunner to the NCAA, established radical changes for safety's sake. The NCAA would continue in this capacity, in-sport rule-making body, for another 50 years or so before becoming the cartel it is today.

Other inflection points have been the creation of two-platoon football the first time in 1941 ending in 1954 and the second time in 1965 and the widespread racial integration of the sport in the 1970s.

Today the inflection point is again safety related. The sport is getting more physical and more dangerous as society is getting less tolerant of violence and wealthier--meaning the value assigned to safety and health are growing. Just as when the highest scoring offense meets up against the lowest point allowing defense, something's got to give. If not, this could be the end.

Here is a spitball list of some potentially safety enhancing changes to the game. Perhaps changes like these would be enough to save football. To many traditionalists, myself included, these may seem quite unpalatable. But the truth is change of some kind has to come. We can continue to dance around this if we want to, but we might be left behind. Some aspects of football as we know it today probably will someday look totally removed from the real world--the actions of imbeciles with everything out of control.

• Get rid of the intentional grounding rule.
• Outlaw all blocking below the waist.
• Outlaw any tackling or blocking where the one tackling or blocking leaves his feet.
• Extend the automatic ejection rule for "targeting" (one that I applaud except for the poor decision to not allow the 15-yard penalty portion to be reviewed as the ejection decision is reviewed) to horse-collar tackles or facemask infractions to include helmet and head tackles. For facemasks, perhaps bring back the idea of a difference in severity by including the ejection for more severe facemask infractions.
• Outlaw zone defense including perhaps not allowing any defender to start play farther than 10 yards behind the line of scrimmage.
• End kickoffs and punts--force fourth down attempts. 

Recycling my mind

You may remember that here at MM we are always looking for ways to change our minds. In fact, it is an ongoing resolution. Well, we may have found my jewel of the Nile for this year.

I referenced this recycling conversation in my last blog post. I highly encourage you to read all the essays and followup conversation. Mike Munger makes what is for me the first rational point I've ever encountered theoretically supporting mandatory recycling programs. Recycling is an economics and business issue. It is about optimal use of resources. The problem might be that we have too little of it. Why? Because the incentives might be messed up. How? Because we want them to be. I don't mean choose them to be in some sinister, corporate-cronyism sort of way (although there is plenty of that in the larger political economy of recycling). I mean truly want them to be . . . to a degree and as an unintended consequence.

The intention is to make landfills artificially cheap by subsidizing them so that illegal and undesirable dumping is minimized. As a result the relative incentive to recycle is lower than it should be as compared to landfilling. In his response essay Steven Landsburg raises very good and strong concerns about what that actually implies for a recycling effort. Remember, I said theoretical case for mandatory recycling. It is in seeing now a theoretical defense of mandatory recycling (or preferably some less coercive means of encouraging recycling) that I have changed my mind. To that point and in his last response in "The Conversation" Munger makes a very Coasian/Hayekian point about how we need to shift the incentives (Coase would emphasize property rights here) but that he doesn't know, a la Hayek, what that solution(s) will actually be. I agree very much with that thought process.

Another very important point raised throughout the issue is how the moral crusade for recycling is quite an awful thing. It magnifies and worsens all that is bad about excessive recycling, and most mandatory recycling is excessive. A little neglected in the issue is the simplistic but problematic solution of fighting the subsidy come incentive problem with an additional subsidy--this time for recycling. That would be the road to a farm bill for waste/recycling. You think I hate mandatory recycling now . . .

Rule of democracy: politicians don't lead, they follow.

I've thought about this idea for some time, and I continue to see examples of it. It isn't original to me except maybe to the extent I find it nearly ubiquitous.

I believe a rule of democracy is that politicians do not tend to lead but rather tend to follow the common view. This is true in a general sense and in most specific instances. On the surface it shouldn't be surprising, after all democracy is should give rise to this, and it is unclear if in aggregate it is a feature or a bug. I believe it is a bug on net, but only slightly, and I assign low confidence to this view. Say what you will about the results of totalitarianism, at least it is an ethos of leadership.

The most recent example I found was this one from Todd Zywicki of the Volokh Conspiracy. It the piece he is pointing out that traffic fatalities were falling for a steady and long period before the formal introduction of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1970. His discussion is a bit richer than just that as he considers the merits of liability law and regulation versus market forces. Here is the graph that caught my eye (original source):

A similar graph can be plotted for nearly every regulatory agency. The one above reminded me of one I saw back in college, which led me to get out my old Economics of Regulation and Antitrust textbook. In that example workplace safety is shown to be steadily declining prior to and after the creation of OSHA.

I think Robin Hansen would be in agreement with my view--"Politics isn't about policy".

The reason I think this is a net bug is that government isn't well suited for many of the tasks it takes on. The incentives are bad, perverse, or at best non existent. Government is highly subject to regulatory capture. Government's one-size-fits-all approach, which is a natural and good product from equality before the law, is antithetical to evolutionary adaptation.

The reason I think this is only a slight net bug is that what we see generally is just a codification of the mores and demands society otherwise possesses. Hence, my libertarian problems with the 1964 Civil Rights Act with its limitations on freedom of association are mitigated by the virtues the law sought to create and the fact that society was moving that way anyhow. Government then just becomes a clumsy way to achieve what we are otherwise moving toward.

I'm sure I'll have more examples and more thoughts on this. Suffice it for now to summarize that while regulatory approaches to problems are suboptimal solutions (at best second-best if not third-best approaches) they are in fact more solution than new problem. But of course when opportunity cost exceeds benefit at the margin even slightly, the makings for compound disaster are created.

When it comes to justifying economic development initiatives and incentives, public officials and those seeking favorable treatment from state and local government generally find it easy. And the most common drumbeat is “Jobs! Jobs! Jobs!” But I’ve noticed a trend where it seems the economic profession’s criticisms are affecting a positive change. Alas, I believe the change is chimerical.

We now hear the champions of economic development talking the talk that “not all economic development is created equal” and “there are some developments that are just not worth the price”. But I think this is a sales pitch to quiet the dissent without actually making a change. The mantra is still JOBS!, but now we hear of “primary” or more desirable jobs versus “secondary” or less desirable jobs. The definition of these two alleged distinct types of jobs shows some fundamental misunderstandings of economic analysis.

Here is the idea. Suppose you are an economic planner representing a regionally large, nationally small but important city. Oklahoma City is a good example. Two prospective firms are each considering a new location in one of a few cities, and Oklahoma City has made the short list for both firms. You know what each wants, say it is a ten-year tax break that amounts to $5,000,000, but the problem is because your city operates under strict balanced budget accounting, you are only authorized to give up to $5,000,000 in tax incentives away. That amount may go up or down in a year, but for now that is all you can agree to. Both firms want it, and you know with high certainty that either firm will take it and choose your city but without it the firms will go elsewhere. You want the jobs (because, after all, it is JOBS!); so you must decide to which firm to extend the incentive.

• Firm A is a call center that will have 100 employees who will take calls from around the world to solve computer technology problems for a fee.
• Firm B is a high-end automotive mechanic service employing 100 who will compete with local dealerships to offer high quality auto repair. The customers base is expected to be nearly 100% local.

The average wage and distribution of wages is the same between the two firms.

To the economic planner Firm A is offering “primary” jobs while Firm B is offering “secondary” jobs. Never mind the fact that jobs are not a good but a cost—there is a reason people aspire to retirement and Garfield hates Mondays. Firm A is “bringing in wealth” by exporting the service calls and importing the customers’ payment for service. Firm B is “moving around wealth” by selling auto repair for payment all within the locality. The preference is intuitive since in Firm A’s case revenue is flowing into the city rather than just revolving around the city as with Firm B. But the intuition here is a deeply flawed economic analysis. It stems from fundamentally misunderstanding the economics of exchange.

When a firm adds value to society, it does so by using less resources than it provides. The measure of this is profit. But profit in the case of both firms flows to the owners who may or may not reside in your community. Because you as economic developer are trying to grow quality jobs, you must consider which jobs are more desirable--remember, you only can give the incentive to one firm. Firm A gives up call center services exporting them outside of the community in exchange for money from outside the community which is partially used to pay the 100 employees' wages. Firm B gives up auto repair services for money all of which remains in the community. Firm B is retaining all of the benefit within the community while Firm A is sending away half of the benefit.

To make this clearer we should remove the monetary component, which serves to muddy the analysis. Ultimately, money is a proxy for what it can buy. At its essence exchange is still a bartering process; it's just that half of the barter is anything you want it to be (anything money can buy--so not love, Dr. McDreamy). Let's replace money with food. Perhaps now we can see it clearly: Firm A is sending computer services out of the community in exchange for food while Firm B is facilitating people within the community exchanging auto services for food. Both exchanges are mutually beneficial to the parties involved. But if you are going to prefer the local society over the society at large since you're the local economic developer, then you should prefer Firm B because that firm is retaining all the benefits (goods and services along with gains from trade) within the community.

Taxes are the price we pay to live in an insane society

It's that time of year again. Time for all Americans to take Uncle Sam's annual insanity quiz: if you can get through the tax forms and still think it all makes sense, congratulations, you're nuts! Notice that I'm not even criticizing tax rates or tax burdens for being too high. At this point I'm only complaining that the process is bat guano crazy.

There are lots of ways to raise as much revenue as we raise today while being immensely more efficient not to mention being fairer. We don't even have to give up all those wonderful special interest giveaways. There are plenty of ways to subsidize them and incentivize behavior otherwise to support all the various things without which society would break down--like jobs for tax preparers, mortgage interest rebates, 366-day stock holdings, and trains running to nowhere. Or would straightforward, simple subsidies be too obviously indefensible?

Regardless, here are my top alternatives to our current tax nightmare (each would be a wholesale replacement of all that befuddles us today):

• A value-added tax (VAT) applicable to all goods and services--no exceptions.
• A final goods and services sales tax as described here.
• A total compensation payroll tax (this means all wages and benefits including education/training, equity including stock options, and health insurance, et al. would be taxable benefits).

The whole mess reminds me of this:

Today also marks the infamous 2-year anniversary of Black Friday as it is known in the poker community. That is the day that a US Attorney unsealed an indictment against Internet poker companies sloppily labeling online poker a crime, a baseless charge that was later dropped, and shutting down effectively all online poker in the United States. As the cases against those charged with money laundering and bank fraud continue to play out and millions of dollars in player funds sit in limbo, it is not at all surprising that a government-created, quasi-black market attracted shady characters and suboptimal market outcomes. The Poker Players Alliance continues the fight for freedom.

Who benefits from recruiting deregulation?

The media tend to follow conventional wisdom. Sports analysis is much so the rule than the exception. Here is case in point #342 . . .

CBS Sports is guilty in this case by failing to connect the dots to the obvious--that Alabama has more to lose than gain in the NCAA's new recruiting deregulation. 

Here is the big surprise:

But, according to al.com, Saban told Birmingham's Over the Mountain Touchdown Club at its Monday banquet that he didn't think the changes were necessary.

"I'm kind of happy with the system we have now," Saban said. "To use the idea that, 'We can't monitor it, so why don't we just make it legal?' I don't buy into that at all. It's like saying, 'People are driving too fast. We can't enforce the speed limit, so let's just take the signs down and let everyone go as fast as they want.'"

No kidding he's "kind of happy with the system we have now". So was Pan Am in 1974 happy with airline regulatory policy. Saban is effectively responding to the question should the NCAA change with, "No! I think you should stay the same wonderful person you are today." Unfortunately, this change is just a change in clothes. Real reform will be met with much more kicking and screaming.

CBS is also guilty of confusing success with wealth and power:

It has been widely speculated--including by [Georgia athletic director Greg] McGarity himself--that wealthy programs like Alabama would gain a competitive advantage over less-wealthy schools by employing whole staffs of recruiters.

Georgia is a "wealthy" program. Georgia is on the same side of this as Alabama. It is the Georgia Techs and Boise States of the world who stand the most to gain from NCAA ease up.

Looking to the example of OU and OSU, it takes one wealthy donor to elevate a program to much higher plateaus. But staying there is made very difficult in a world where competition is limited in scope and scale. By removing certain dimensions of differentiation and competitive advantage (that is by having stringent recruiting rules as there are currently), the NCAA helps Alabama, et al.

Obama's confusion about "wise" investment

In his latest State of the Union address, President Obama referred to investing, investors, or investment 13 times. Here are a few of those references:

So let's set party interests aside, and work to pass a budget that replaces reckless cuts with smart savings and wise investments in our future.

It's not a bigger government we need, but a smarter government that sets priorities and invests in broad-based growth.

If we want to make the best products, we also have to invest in the best ideas.

Unfortunately, making wise investments isn't as easy as asking Mr. Obama how many licks it takes to get to the cash-flow center of a public equity fund. The track record of government investment is abysmally poor. And we shouldn't expect it not to be. The government lacks the vital characteristics necessary for successful investment decision making. Most importantly the necessary incentives are not only absent; they are in reverse. Government does not have a profit motive properly aligned with success (consider this the front-end of good investment incentives)--that is not to say that individuals and groups within government lack a profit motive. Government also does not have the correct feedback system whereby success is rewarded and failure is punished. Consider this the back-end of good incentives, and this is the reversed incentive part. Government tends to reward failure at the expense of success.

Another vital component largely and effectively absent from government is talented investors. Rather than attracting and nurturing creative, entrepreneurial innovators and risk takers, government tends to attract and nurture assembly-line bureaucrats and rent seekers.

Government is the wrong process for "wise" investment. Obama doesn't seem to understand this. His administration's malinvestments into solar, et al. are clear evidence of this. Aside from the fraud, there is a key problem with these types of investment. For the investment to be wise, it isn't sufficient to know what the actual technology of the future will be. As very difficult as that part of the task is, an equally challenging feature is getting the timing right.

Being too early to invest in even the right technology can still destroy resources; i.e., not be a wise investment. Imagine travelling in time to 1980 to invest in teaching HTML coding, manufacturing Boeing 787s or Airbus 380s, or building contemporary Whole Foods grocery stores in mid-western cities.

A famous investor adage is, "In the end I was right, I my timing was just too early." Another is that, "The market can stay irrational longer than you can remain solvent." We seem to be testing those two adages via government "investment" at an alarming rate.

Some crazy scheme in order to make a profit

I want to boost traffic on this site. I know incentives work. Here is the plan:

• I want all my readers to forward links to this blog.
• To incentivize you please, inform everyone you send a link that they owe you $1. 
• Also, inform them that they too are entitled to $1 for every link they send owed by the recipient of the link. 
• It does not matter if the recipient has already received a link. In fact, that is an important part of building this network and realizing the fringe benefits.

This should create a fairly efficient Ponzi-like scheme by taking out the middle man. Based on my cursory reading of Keynesian economics, it should also boost 2013 GDP by at least 10% and bring us full employment in short order. From my cursory reading of rational expectations, just by publishing this post all the benefits should arise. From my cursory reading of monetarism, all U.S. dollar-based economies will soon be the next Zimbabwe.

James Buchanan, RIP and ATRA

This past week we lost an intellectual giant, James Buchanan, whose contributions were and are still under appreciated. Among other contributions, Buchanan helped discover and bring to a fuller light facts that should have been obvious: political actors are subject self interest and incentives just like everyone else and government failure is as much if not more a fact of life as is market failure.

See these excellent appreciations of the Mr. Buchanan's life work:
     From Alex Tabarrok
     From Steve Horwitz
     From Arnold Kling
     From Don Boudreaux
     and From the WSJ editorial page

It is a bit fitting unfortunately that Buchanan's death would come so closely to the passage of the American Tax Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA)--the resolution to the so called tax portion of the Fiscal Cliff. This disgusting example of political corruption would have been well understood by Buchanan. The act contains nothing resembling fiscal responsibility or improvement. It is a giveaway to the special interest of the tax lobby (tax preparers, tax advisors, estate lawyers, et al.) and other corporate special interest. It leaves us with a tax code more punishing on work and savings, more complicated, more encouraging of the rich to spend and use rather than save and share, more taxing on all taxpayers as everyone's income tax burden has increased (not just but especially those making more than a couple hundred thousand in a particular year--the $450,000 is a fiction), and more likely to bring us fiscal problems down the road. But it should have all been of no surprise to any of us; I was not surprised. The whole thing reminds me of this exchange:

Muriel Blandings: You remember Bunny Funkhouser, dear, that clever young interior decorator that we met at the Collins' cocktail party.

Jim Blandings: You mean that young man with the open-toed sandals? What about him? 

Muriel Blandings: Well, you know how long we've said we've got to do something about fixing up this apartment. Well, a couple of weeks ago, he called, and I asked him to come over, and he had some simply wonderful ideas, and I didn't want to bother you with sketches and estimates until I knew whether we could afford it. So I sent them over to Bill. 

Jim Blandings: How much? 

Muriel Blandings: What's the point in asking how much until you know what you're going to get?

Jim Blandings: I've seen Bunny Funkhouser. I *know* what I'm going to get. 

RIP, James Buchanan. We still have a lot to learn from you.

Helium: a lesson on "shortages", preferences, and rationing

The Independent reports on the latest scare in precious commodities. It seems we are running low on helium. "Low" is a relative and subjective term, of course. We are also running low on gold, beach-front property, private airplanes, and a bunch of other stuff. It's been that way for some time. I guess it is only news when a scientist complains.

"...Now supplies are running so low scientists want to ration it."

Maybe these scientists at Cambridge should head over to the Econ department to see if anybody has ever come up with a good way to ration scarce goods.

I like this quote as well:

"Cheap helium also drives misuse. A staggering 8 per cent of the world's helium supply is currently used for filling party balloons," he said.

I like how only scientists get to define "misuse". What would the buyers and sellers of party balloons say?

But he does seem to understand something about market interference:

"It is difficult to imagine an adequate market incentive to collect helium during natural gas extraction while the US government is selling off its entire stockpile at bargain prices," Dr Stokes said.

Professor Ned Brainard was unavailable for comment.

An outsider's view of insider trading

As an investment professional, I follow the insider trading laws. And as a CFA charterholder, I follow the more rigorous ethics required by the CFA Institute. But I don't believe in insider trading restrictions. That is I don't subscribe to the theory of justice underpinning insider trading prohibitions. I would like to see these prohibitions largely changed to the extent of elimination generally. I believe this would be an improvement to our society's justice and economic/market efficiency.

The idea of prohibitions on insider transactions hinges on the idea that profiting from knowledge is good but profiting from too much knowledge is bad. Those supporting insider trading restrictions would probably say I've got that wrong. That it isn't too much knowledge but rather unfair knowledge. My answer to that is there is no principled concept of "fair" that allows one to draw a line in the way insider trading laws do making the distinguishment between fair knowledge and unfair knowledge. It takes logical magic tricks to make the distinction. Simply put, the distinction is arbitrary, which is antithetic to logical principals. The arbitrariness can be seen in how ridiculously vague the insider laws are. This makes for dangerous risks--it puts arbitrary power in the hands of already powerful people.

Let's make clear a couple of points. In my opinion insider trading prohibitions are not about prohibiting fraud or misrepresentation. Hence, reducing or eliminating them would not be any sort of condoning of fraud or misrepresentation. They are about making illegal a victimless crime that has in the general public opinion a very negative perception (people benefiting from too much information).

Prohibiting insider trading has several very real negative effects:

• It violates property rights--the right to freely buy and sell in the market.
• It reduces economic/market efficiency by limiting who can bring knowledge into the price system.
• It promotes a false sense of security (moral hazard) by promising that securities transactions are between generally equally equipped traders--this illusion as well as the above problem with market efficiency is mitigated by the next effect.
• It drives some market transactions (insider transactions) into the dark and gives pause to other transactions for fear of raising insider suspicions. This is very much like the negative effects an onerous, complicated tax system brings--wasted resource allocation in compliance and reduced otherwise beneficial activity in avoidance.

My solution is disclosure-based insider trading rules. I am not alone in this idea. Basically I would like to see insider trading laws replaced by a rule requiring open disclosure of any "significant" transactions from an "insider". I would let the courts decide what a "significant" transaction would be, but as a guidance perhaps a trade over $10,000 in notional or exercise value. I would expand the definition of an "insider" to include any employee of a firm (not just the current definition which includes a company's officers, directors and any beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class of the company's equity securities) and as with the current definition any individual who trades shares based on material non-public information in violation of some duty of trust whether inherent or imputed (e.g., getting a tip from the CEO one could reasonably expect was material non-public information). Now more truly if you're not "inside", you're "outside". Failure to properly disclose an insider trade would result in a fine equal to say 25% of the gross profit from the alleged trade. Any employee trade not properly disclosed would also result in the same fine incurred by the employer unless the employee was acting with malicious intent. 

The reason companies would find this change to be largely in their interest is the same reason why companies would want restrictions on insider trading in many cases. Companies have at least two reasons why they don't want their officers making some kinds of insider trades: 

1. It makes for very negative PR for a CEO to sell (buy) the company stock on insider knowledge that negative (positive) news is forthcoming. 
2. A company wants a CEO's incentive to be with the long-term interest of the company whereby he gains (looses) as the firm gains (looses). (Unfortunately, we continue to allow insiders to avoid losses their firms incur generally at tax-payer expense. But that is a problem for another blog post.)

I would anticipate greater popularity of agreements between corporations and their insiders that allow for clawback of earnings or outright damages for insider trades not in company interest. 

What if the Fiscal Cliff solution were to actually get us out of this fine tax mess?

As mentioned previously, I would like to briefly sketch out an approximation of what a terrifically better tax system would look like. This is a second-best solution since I start with the assumption we need a tax burden so massive as to accommodate a government nearly as massive as the one we have today.

If I were asked, "explain taxes to me like I'm a four-year old," I would struggle. Ron Swanson (below) does a decent job striking the emotional chord many of us feel, but this is obviously an emotional appeal designed around the tight confines of satirical comedy. For if it were a comprehensive approach, the tax code would come out looking much worse.



Swanson only gets at the raw theft of it all. He leaves out the destructive properties of bad incentives and resources wasted in compliance and avoidance and evasion.

If we have to have a taxes, we at least should have them with minimal impact both direct and indirect. Directly we waste resources complying and seeking to avoid. Indirectly the effects are much more severe. By taxing capital, we discourage work, risk-taking, and saving. By taxing consumption, we discourage work, risk taking, and consumption. By taxing work, we discourage work, risk taking, consumption, and saving. Work, risk taking, consumption, and saving are all desirable things. But saving has added desirability as it creates opportunities for more of all the other desirable things. Saving is deferred consumption. The reward for the deferring is more later. So it should be obvious, but sadly is not to too many that taxing (discouraging) saving has a compounding negative effect. Which brings me to my proposal for greatly improving upon this fine mess of a tax system we have.

First, we must eliminate all capital taxation (capital gains with its ridiculous long-term/short-term distinction, dividend and interest income, estate taxation, et al.). A flat-income tax would be a big, BIG improvement over were we are today. But we can do better still as this would still be an income tax with the associated negative effect on saving.

Here is the idea (not at all original to me): tax consumption (a sales tax). Let's assume the rate is 20%. We will apply this rate to the purchase of all final goods and services. Income taxes and payroll taxes (save for a new one outlined below) are gone. No longer will we need to turn in an annual term paper on our income to the IRS. No more manipulations of charitable giving and loss carry forward. No more shelters, loopholes, deductions, exemptions, forms 8166 sub A worksheet nine, math that you never can get to add up to the same total twice. Buy something and a tax is built in (this is preferable rather than being added on after the fact). The business submits sales data and taxes due. Most of this infrastructure is in place already. And notice how little opportunity there is for tax evasion save for the ever-dwindling cash side business.

"But what about the poor?" I hear you say. We rebate to every adult the amount of consumption tax that a spending level near the poverty level would imply. Let's target $20,000 (about $5,000 below the official poverty level of income). 20% of $20,000 is $4,000. That amount is payable to every adult American citizen.

"But what about poor children?" I hear you cry. We rebate to every adult claiming a unique dependent (someone cannot be claimed twice as with the current regime) some amount of consumption tax an incremental amount of spending would imply. Let's target $10,000. 20% of $10,000 is $2,000.

"But what about the 'rich' who are now getting checks from the government?" I hear you shriek. That's where the low-impact payroll tax comes in. I think of it as "low impact" because it will be handled by employers similarly to how they handle payroll taxes now. We will maintain the benefit of not having individuals have to play guess how many toothpicks are on the floor with Uncle Sam. The payroll tax will be a marginal rate of say 10% applied to total compensation (wages and benefits) starting at $100,000 with this threshold indexed to inflation.

The structure is the major source of the benefits. The rates and levels are negotiable. Here is what it looks like for a family of four:

Notice that it is progressive. Notice that it is straightforward. Notice that it is not of this world . . . yet.

Update: Some might ask how housing should be treated: as a capital good excluded from taxation or a consumption good subject to taxation. The answer is it depends but can work well in either case. As a capital good making the assumption (probably a bad assumption, that housing is always an investment), it would be excluded. As a consumption good, it would lower the overall tax rate necessary to generate appropriate revenues. The most logical treatment in my mind is to treat any sale or rental of real property as a capital good. Although this increases the tax rate otherwise applicable to consumption, it is a much more straightforward and less manipulable arrangement.

Steal this blog post

I want to discuss my views on the currently trendy topic of copyright and patent law. It seems the more the law tightens its grip, the more innovation slips through its fingers. First it was Napster, et al. and next it is 3-D printing. Are these continued developments a threat to our principals and way of life? It is important to remember Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which states that Congress has the power:

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

As the recently published and almost immediately pulled House Republican Study Committee report noted, this is the purpose of copyright [and patent, I'll add]. Not to simply or necessarily compensate the creator of content [or inventions in the case of patents]. The issue at state is not about what a creator deserves or is owed. It is about promoting the general good of society. Too often the vested interests (Big Mouse, Big Music, Big Drug, Big Computer, etc.) confuse the issue by confusing successful market outcomes (the worthy goal per se) with individual creator or company or industry success (potentially but not necessarily worthy goals).

Copyright and patent are ultimately about special contracts. They are societal contracts that are forced upon us--a government-granted monopoly which casts a do-not-compete clause upon us all. We already should be concerned. But there is logical, principled footing here. I cannot make you share is a good property rights principal. I want to extend it to another, similar concept: You cannot make me not share. That's where I'm heading shortly. But first, some grounding.

Pragmatically and in principal, we want both creativity and sharing. The problem is sharing can hinder creativity because creativity can be costly and sharing can prevent benefits from flowing adequately to the creator who incurred the cost. Hence, we get copyrights and patents as the method to find a happy middle. But we have many reasons to believe we are far from the happy middle.

Briefly, here is my understanding of current law. To claim a copyright an idea must meet three requirements:

1. The idea must have fixation in some tangible medium of expression.
2. The idea must be original.
3. The idea must meet a minimal level of creativity.

To receive a patent an invention must also meet three requirements:

1. The invention must be novel. 
2. The invention must be non obvious.
3. The invention must be useful.

An easy but perhaps not complete solution to our problem (remember the problem, sharing might hinder creativity) would be to significantly reduce the duration of copyright and patent (C&P). You can complicate this solution and perhaps improve it by differentiating by type of C&P--i.e., pharmaceutics different than software; books different than Internet breaking news stories. Another possibly complementary idea at least for patents would be to make proving the patent case much, much harder. John Duffy at Wired has some very good thoughts on this. Specifically, he suggests we should do a better job defining and enforcing non obviousness. 

I like these solutions, but they don't seem complete. In fact to be critical, Duffy's idea might be too much hand waving and wishful thinking ignoring the public choice problems. What I want ideally is to jointly maximize sharing and creativity--find the happy middle. Let's start by assuming creativity is independent of sharing. In that case I submit the following: 

Principles of Ethical Sharing, Duplication, and Simulation in a World of Costless Creativity

Duplication is a form of sharing. Sharing is ethical. I can listen to my copy of a song with you, I can lend you my physical copy of a song, I can give you my physical copy of a song, and I can duplicate my copy of a song and give or sell the duplication to you. Duplication satisfies two conditions; it must:

1.      Be indistinguishable from the consumer’s point of view.

2.      Be non-rivalrous from the consumer’s point of view.

The second part is important: Sharing is duplication only if you and I can enjoy it at the same time separately. The first part is where it gets interesting: Sharing is duplication only if the good or service cannot be distinguished from the authentic from the consumer's point of view—otherwise it is simulation. Simulation is ethical if the consumer in a specific case realized or the reasonable-man consumer in a general sense would be expected to realize the simulated good or service is distinct from the authentic. If this test of simulation fails, we have a case of fraud. Trademark violations are fraud, for example. 

Because we don't live in a world of costless creativity, we are going to need C&P to some extent. My solution is to apply C&P only to cases of duplication--not to simulation and of course not to other forms of sharing. In doing so we GREATLY limit the applicability of C&P. Many inventions currently protected by patent law are no longer eligible as they are cases of simulation (this makes moot most of the software patent wars). 

In this solution C&P would honor first to file but recognize concurrent, independent discovery/creation. This allows for simultaneous C&P protection to multiple parties where the first to file would begin the clock on C&P duration. Copyright would be inexpensive to file commensurate with current practices and fees, but patent filing would require a high fee (high enough to discourage speculative, squatting patent filings). There would also be a very substantial cost indexed to inflation to enforce both C&P. The cost of enforcing C&P would be the cost of bringing suit including a loser-pays rule for plaintiffs only. The standard duration of enforcement would be 5 years. This duration would be extendable by purchasing time in annual increments up to a total of 15 years of protection including the original 5. Extensions would need to be filed prior to within one year remaining of C&P life, and the cost of each additional year should be equal to 1/5 the cost of a new 5-year enforcement initial filing of C&P, respectively. Because willingness to pay for additional protection would be based only on the perceived unrealized value of the idea (NPV of future cash flows) and the assumed ease of duplication, there should be a relatively efficient tradeoff between protection and release.

Causes of the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery

My views on the macroeconomic landscape in America and abroad over the past five years, much like the landscape, have been in flux. Here is my current view as to the approximate causes of the Great Recession itself and the reason the recovery has been so poor. I'm limiting my evaluation to the more immediate and direct causes--therefore, the notable absence of multi-decade-long TBTF bailout contributions and regulatory failure including subsidization of housing, et al.

Causes of the recession:

1. Federal Reserve policy failure allowing NGDP growth to fall extraordinarily below trend (the tightest money policy since Hoover). This is the shorter-term portion of the causes. For this I'd approximate 50% of the responsibility. (HT: Scott Sumner)
2. Structural problems perhaps best understood through a Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade (PSST) framework. Included in this grouping is malinvestment playing a major role. This is the longer-term portion of the causes. For this I'd approximate 40% of the responsibility. (HT: Arnold Kling)
3. Everything else. 10% responsibility.

The combination of factors 1 and 2 created the perfect storm for this event to be so damaging. A recent post by Scott Sumner relates to this. Either 1 or 2 would have been sufficient causes for a recession or recession-like events. Cause 1 creates much more acute, short-term pain. Cause 2 creates much more hidden dead-weight loss by changing the fundamental glidepath of growth. Perhaps we lose one-half to one percent off of average annual growth for 10-30 years. This would be a truly colossal loss--remember, growth is a compound number that affects results with many orders of magnitude. 

The reason the recovery has been so poor:

1. Federal Reserve policy failure to get us back to or toward trend NGDP levels. Our inability to close the potential-real gap will make future generations both laugh and cry. I'd give this 55% responsibility.
2. Prolonged PSST difficulties. This is hard to avoid given how bad the PSST problem was. Some good portion of it, mind you, was an unavoidable consequence of free market growth in a less than free market world. Government makes creative destruction less creative and more unnecessarily destructive. I'd give this 25% responsibility.
3. Regime uncertainty and undesirableness, which has many facets. Tax policy is a mess. Government spending is on an unsustainable trend with no likely solution or solver to be found. Regulation continues to respond on cue--more complications and gamesmanship (Dodd-Frank), more intrusions and forced bargains (Obamacare). Minimum wage increases and unemployment benefits extension get the incentives backwards from the goal. I'd give this 15% responsibility.
4. Everything else. Surely there is something else, or are these categories jointly exhaustive? Potentially 5% responsibility. 

As with any economic period, there are many contributing factors and some are and may remain hidden.

Progressives and the new NCAA helmet rule

Progressives believe that if you get the right people in place, government can solve problems. I believe their claim is that the problems would be solved in a net beneficial total outcome sense. The “right” people designing policy are a combination of well-intended, highly intelligent, and expert in the particular field for which they guide policy. Here is an example showing just how weak this philosophy can be. It is a beautiful example of the law of unintended consequences.

The NCAA fits the “right people” bill near perfectly in this case. And what do you want to bet that the solution will not be to reverse the rule but rather to institute a new array of rules designed to counteract the undesirable side effects?